Dodge. Address and Papers-1904.

Address to Army Associations

and

Miscellaneous Papers Relating

to Civil and Spanish Wars

by

Major General Grenville M. Dodge

Address to Army Associations

and

Miscellaneous Papers Relating

to Civil and Spanish Wars

by

Major General GRENVILLE M. DODGE

1904
UNZ & COMPANY,
New York

CONTENTS.

BATTLE OF ATLANTA.

FOUGHT JULY 22nd, 1864.

Paper read before New York Commandery of M. O. L. L.,

BY

MAJOR-GENERAL GRENVILLE M. DODGE.

COMPANIONS:

On the 17th day of July, 1864, Gen'l John B. Hood relieved Gen'l Joseph E. Johnston in command of the confederate army in front of Atlanta, and on the 20th, Hood opened an attack upon Sherman's right commanded by Gen'l Thomas. The attack was a failure and resulted in a great defeat to Hood's Army and the disarrangement of all his plans.

On the evening of the 21st of July, Gen'l Sherman's army had closed up to within two miles of Atlanta, and on that day Force's Brigade of Leggett's Division of Blair's Seventeenth Army Corps carried a prominent hill known as Bald or Leggett's Hill that gave us a clear view of Atlanta, and placed that city within range of our guns. It was a strategic point, and unless the swing of our left was stopped it would dangerously interfere with Hood's communications towards the south. Hood fully appreciated this, and determined upon his celebrated attack in the rear of Gen'l Sherman's Army.

On the 22d of July, the Army of the Tennessee was occupying the rebel intrenchments, its right resting very near the Howard House, south of the Augusta Railroad, thence to Leggett's Hill, which had been carried by Force's assault on the evening of the 21st. From

this hill Giles A. Smith's Division of the Seventeenth Army Corps stretched out southward on a road that occupied this ridge, with a weak flank in air. To strengthen this flank, by order of Gen'l McPherson I sent on the evening of the 21st one Brigade of Fuller's Division, the other being left at Decatur to protect our parked trains. Fuller camped his Brigade about half a mile in the rear of the extreme left and at right angles to Blair's lines and commanding the open ground and valley of the forks of Sugar Creek, a position that proved very strong in the battle. Fuller did not go into line, simply bivouacked ready to respond to any call.

On the morning of the 22d of July, Gen'l McPherson called at my headquarters, and gave me verbal orders in relation to the movement of the 2nd, Sweeney's Division of my, the Sixteenth Corps, which had been crowded out of the line by the contraction of our lines as we neared Atlanta, and told me that I was to take position on the left of the line that Blair had been instructed to occupy and intrench that morning, and cautioned me about protecting my flank very strongly. McPherson evidently thought that there would be trouble on that flank for he rode out to examine it himself.

I moved Sweeney in the rear of our army, on the road leading from the Augusta Railway, down the east branch of Sugar Creek to near where it forks. Then turning west, the road crosses the west branch of Sugar Creek just back where Fuller was camped, and passed up through a strip of woods and through Blair's lines near where his left was refused Up this road Sweeney marched until he reached Fuller, when he halted, waiting until the line I had selected on Blair's proposed new left could be intrenched, so that at mid-day, July 22d, the position of the Army of the Tennessee was as follows: one Division of the Fifteenth across and north of the Augusta Railway facing Atlanta, the balance of the Fifteenth, and all of the Seventeenth Corps behind intrenchments running south of the Railway along a gentle ridge with a gentle slope and clear valley facing Atlanta in front, and another clear valley in the rear The Sixteenth Corps was resting on the road described, entirely in the rear of the Seventeenth and Fifteenth Corps and facing from Atlanta. To the left and left rear the country was heavily wooded. The enemy, therefore was enabled under cover of the forest, to approach close to the rear of our lines.

On the night of July 21st, Hood had transferred Hardee's Corps and two Divisions of Wheeler's Cavalry to our rear going around our left flank, Wheeler attacking Sprague's Brigade Sixteenth Army Corps at Decatur, where our trains were parked. At daylight, Stewart's and Cheatham's Corps and the Georgia militia were withdrawn closer to Atlanta, and in a position to attack simultaneously with Hardee, the

plan thus involving the destroying of the Army of the Tennessee by attacking it in rear and front and the capturing of all its trains corraled at Decatur. Hardee's was the largest Corps in Hood's Army and according to Hood there were thus to move upon the Army of the Tennessee about 40,000 troops.

Hood's order of attack was for Hardee to form entirely in the rear of the Army of the Tennessee, but Hardee claims that he met Hood on the night of the 21st; that he was so late in moving his corps that they changed the plan of attack so that his left was to strike the Seventeenth Corps. He was to swing his right until he enveloped and attacked the rear of the Seventeenth and Fifteenth Corps.

Hood stood in one of the batteries of Atlanta where he could see Blair's left and the front line of the Fifteenth and Seventeenth Corps. He says he was astonished to see the attack come on Blair's left instead of his rear and charges his defeat to that fact, but Hardee when he swung his right and came out in the open, found the Sixteenth Corps in line in the rear of our army, and he was as much surprised to find us there as our army was at the sudden attack in our rear. The driving back by the Sixteenth Corps of Hardee's made his corps drift to the left and against Blair, not only to Blair's left but into his rear, so that what Hood declares was the cause of his failure was not Hardee's fault as his attacks on the Sixteenth Corps were evidently determined, and fierce enough to relieve him from all blame in that matter.

Historians and others who have written of the Battle of Atlanta have been mislead by being governed in their data by the first dispatches of General Sherman, who was evidently misinformed, as he afterwards corrected his dispatches. He stated in the first dispatch that the attack was at 11 A. M., and on Blair's corps, and also that General McPherson was killed about 11 A. M. The fact is Blair was not attacked until half an hour after the attack upon the Sixteenth Corps, and McPherson fell at about 2 P. M General Sherman was at the Howard House, which was miles away from the scene of Hardee's attack in the rear, and evidently did not at first comprehend the terrific fighting that was in progress, and the serious results that would have been effected had the attack succeeded.

The battle began within fifteen or twenty minutes of 12 o'clock (noon) and lasted until midnight, and covered the ground from the Howard House, along the entire front of the Fifteenth (Logan's) Corps, the Seventeenth (Blair's), and on the front of the Sixteenth, which was formed in the rear of the Army, and on to Decatur, where Sprague's Brigade of the Sixteenth Army Corps met and defeated Wheeler's Cavalry. A distance of about seven miles.

The Army of the Tennessee had present on that day at Atlanta and Decatur about 26,000 men; 10,000 in the Fifteenth Army Corps, 9,000 in the Sixteenth Corps and 7,000 in the Seventeenth, about 21,000 of these were in line of battle. Three Brigades of the Sixteenth Corps were absent, the Sixteenth Corps having 5,000 men in a single line which received the attack of the Three Divisions of Hardee's Corps, Hardee's left, Cleburn's Division lapping the extreme left of Blair, and joining Cheatham's Corps which attacked Blair from the Atlanta front and according to Hood they were joined by the Georgia militia under General Smith extending down the line in front of the Army of Ohio and Cumberland, Stewart's Corps occupied the works and held the lines in front of the Army of the Cumberland. The Sixteenth Army Corps fought in the open ground; the Fifteenth and Seventeenth behind intrenchments.

Where I stood just at the rear of the Sixteenth Army Corps, I could see the entire line of that corps, and could look up and see the enemy's entire front as they emerged from the woods, and I quickly saw that both of my flanks were overlapped by the enemy. Knowing General McPherson was some two miles away, I sent a staff officer to General Giles A. Smith, requesting him to refuse his left and protect the gap between the Seventeenth Corps and my right, which he sent word he would do. Later, as the battle progressed, and I saw no movement on the part of General Smith, I sent another officer to inform him that the enemy were passing my right flank, which was nearly opposite his center, and requested him to refuse his left immediately, or he would be cut off. This officer (Lieut. D. Sheffly who belonged to the Signal Corps, and acted as my aide only for the time being), found, on reaching Smith, that he was just becoming engaged; that he had received orders to hold his line, with a promise that other troops would be thrown into the gap.

My second messenger Lieut. Sheffly returning over the road upon which McPherson was a few minutes later shot dead, met the general on the road with a very few attendants, turned to warn him of his dangerous position, assuring him that the enemy held the woods and were advancing. The general paying no heed to his warning and moving on, my aide turned and followed him. They had proceeded but a short distance into the woods when a sharp command, "Halt," was heard from the skirmish line of the rebels. Without heeding the command, General McPherson and his party wheeled their horses and at that moment a heavy volley was poured in, killing McPherson and so frightening the horses that they became unmanageable and plunged into the underbrush in different directions. My aide became separated from the general and the rest of the party, and was knocked

from his horse by coming in contact with a tree, and lay for some time in an unconscious condition on the ground. As soon as he was sufficiently recovered he returned on foot to me, having lost his horse and equipments. Of General McPherson he saw nothing after his fall. His watch, crushed by contact with the tree, was stopped at two minutes past 2 o'clock, which fixed the time of General McPherson's death.

General McPherson could not have left his point of observation more than a few minutes when I detected the enemy's advance in the woods some distance to my right, and between that flank and General Blair's rear. Fuller quickly changed front with a portion of his brigade to confront them, and pushing promptly to the attack captured their skirmish line and drove back their main forces. Upon the persons of some of these prisoners we found McPherson's papers, field-glass, etc., which conveyed to me the first knowledge I had of his death, or rather, as I then supposed, of his capture by the enemy, and seeing that the papers were important I sent them by my chief of staff with all haste to General Sherman.

General McPherson, it seems, had just witnessed the decisive grapple of the Sixteenth Corps with the charging columns of the enemy, and, as probably conveying his own reflections at that moment, I quote the language of General Strong, the only staff officer present with him at that critical moment.

"The General and myself," said Strong, "accompanied only by our orderlies, rode on and took positions on the right of Dodge's line, and witnessed the desperate assaults of Hood's army.

"The divisions of Generals Fuller and Sweeney were formed in a single line of battle in the open fields, without cover of any kind (Fuller's division on the right), and were warmly engaged. The enemy, massed in columns three or four lines deep, moved out of the dense timber several hundred yards from General Dodge's position, and after gaining fairly the open fields, halted and opened a rapid fire upon the Sixteenth Corps. They, however, seemed surprised to find our infantry in line of battle, prepared for attack, and after facing for a few minutes the destructive fire from the divisions of Generals Fuller and Sweeney, fell back in disorder to the cover of the woods. Here, however, their lines were quickly reformed, and they again advanced, evidently determined to carry the position.

"The scene at this time was grand and impressive. It seemed to us that every mounted officer of the attacking column was riding at the front of, or on the right or left of, the first line of battle. The regimental colors waved and fluttered in advance of the lines, and not a shot was fired by the rebel infantry, although the movement was

covered by a heavy and well-directed fire from artillery, which was posted in the woods and on higher ground, and which enabled the guns to bear upon our troops with solid shot and shell, firing over the attacking column.

"It seemed impossible, however, for the enemy to face the sweeping, deadly fire from Fuller's and Sweeney's divisions, and the guns of the Fourteenth Ohio and Welker's batteries of the Sixteenth Corps fairly mowed great swaths in the advancing columns. They showed great steadiness, and closed up the gaps and preserved their allignments, but the iron and leaden hail which was poured upon them was too much for flesh and blood to stand, and, before reaching the center of the open field, the columns were broken up and thrown into great confusion. Taking advantage of this, Dodge with portions of Fuller's and Sweeney's divisions, with bayonets fixed, charged the enemy and drove them back to the woods, taking many prisoners.

"General McPherson's admiration for the steadiness and determined bravery of the Sixteenth Corps was unbounded. General Dodge held the key to the position.

"Had the Sixteenth Corps given way the rebel army would have been in the rear of the Seventeenth and Fifteenth Corps, and would have swept like an avalanche over our supply trains, and the position of the Army of the Tennessee would have been very critical, although, without doubt, the result of the battle would have been in our favor because the armies of the Cumberland and Ohio were close at hand, and the enemy would have been checked and routed further on."

General Blair in his official report of the battle says, "I witnessed the first furious assault upon the Sixteenth Army Corps, and its prompt and gallant repulse. It was a fortunate circumstance for that whole army that the Sixteenth Army Corps occupied the position I have attempted to describe, at the moment of the attack, and although it does not become me to comment upon the brave conduct of the officers and men of that Corps, still I can not refrain from expressing my admiration for the manner in which the Sixteenth Corps met and repulsed the repeated and persistent attacks of the enemy."

The Sixteenth Corps has a record in that battle which we seldom see in the annals of war. It met the shock of battle and fired the last shot late that night, as the enemy stubbornly yielded its grasp on Bald Hill. It fought on four parts of the field, and everywhere with equal success; it lost no gun that it took into the engagement, and its losses were almost entirely in killed and wounded—the missing having been captured at Decatur through getting mired in a swamp.

At no time during the Atlanta campaign was there present in the Sixteenth Corps more than two small divisions of three brigades each

and at this time these two divisions were widely scattered; on the Atlanta field only ten regiments and two batteries were present, three entire brigades being absent from the corps. It was called upon to meet the assault of at least three divisions or nine brigades, or at the least forty-nine regiments, all full to the utmost that a desperate emergency could swell them, impelled by the motive of the preconcerted surprise, and orders from their commander at all hazards to sweep over any and all obstructions; while, on the other hand, the force attacked and surprised was fighting without orders, guided only by the exigency of the moment. Their captures represented forty-nine different regiments of the enemy. How many more regiments were included in those nine brigades I have never been able to learn. The fact that this small force, technically, if not actually, in march, in a perfectly open field, with this enormously superior force leaping upon them from the cover of dense woods, was able to hold its ground and drive its assailants, pell-mell, back to the cover of the woods again, proves that when a great battle is in progress, or a great emergency occurs, no officer can tell what the result may be when he throws in his forces, be they 5,000 or 20,000 men; and it seems to me to be impossible to draw the line that gives the right to a subordinate officer to use his own judgement in engaging an enemy when a great battle is within his hearing.

Suppose the Sixteenth Corps, with less than 5,000 men, seeing at least three times their number in their front, should have retreated, instead of standing and fighting as it did, what would have been the result? I say that in all my experience in life, until the two forces struck and the Sixteenth Corps stood firm, I never passed more anxious moments.

Sprague's Brigade, of the same corps, was engaged at the same time within hearing, but on a different field at Decatur, fighting and stubbornly holding that place, knowing that if he failed the trains massed there and en route from Roswell, would be captured. His fight was a gallant and, sometimes, seemingly almost hopeless one—giving ground inch by inch, until, finally, he obtained a position that he could not be driven from, and one that protected the entire trains of the army.

As Hardee's attack fell upon the Sixteenth Army Corps, his left Division (Celburn's) lapped over and beyond Blair's left, and swung around his left front; they poured down through the gap between the left of the Seventeenth and the right of the Sixteenth Corps, taking Blair in front flank and rear. Cheatham's Corps moved out of Atlanta and attacked in Blair's front. Gen'l Giles A. Smith commanded Blair's left Division his right connecting with Leggett at Bald Hill,

where Leggett's Division held the line until they connected with the Fifteenth Corps, and along this front the battle raged with great fury.

As Cleburn advanced along the open space between the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Corps they cut off from Blair's left and captured a portion of two regiments of his command, and forced the Seventeenth Corps to form new lines utilizing the old intrenchments thrown up by the enemy, fighting first on one side and then on the other, as the attack would come from Hardee in the rear or Cheatham in the front, until about 3.30 P. M. when evidently after a lull, an extraordinary effort was made by the rebels to wipe out Giles A. Smith's Division and capture Leggett's Hill, the enemy approaching under cover of the woods until they were within fifty yards of Smith's temporary position, when they pressed forward until the fight became a hand to hand conflict across the trenches occupied by Smith, the troops using bayonet freely and the officers their swords. This attack failed; it was no doubt timed to occur at the same time that Cheatham's Corps, attacked from the Atlanta front, which Leggett met. The brunt of Cheatham's attack was against Leggett's Hill, the key to the position of that portion of the Army of the Tennessee. General Giles A. Smith's Division had to give up the works they occupied and fall into line at right angles with Leggett's Division, Leggett's Hill being the apex of the formation; and here, for three quarters of an hour, more desperate fighting was done around this position than I can describe. Up to midnight the enemy occupied one side of the works while we occupied the other, neither side giving way until Hood saw that the whole attack was a failure when those who were on the outside of the works finally surrendered to us. Their attack at this angle was a determined and resolute one, advancing up to our breastworks on the crest of the hill, planting their flag side by side with ours, and fighting hand to hand until it grew so dark that nothing could be seen, but the flash of the guns from the opposite side of the works. The ground covered by these attacks was literally strewn with the dead of both sides. The loss of Blair's Corps was 1801 killed, wounded and missing. Blair's left struck in the rear flank, and front gave away slowly, gradually, fighting for every inch of ground, until their left was opposite the right flank of the Sixteenth Corps; then they halted, and held the enemy refusing to give another inch.

It would be difficult in all the annals of war, to find a parallel to the fighting of the Seventeenth Corps; first from one side of its works, and then from the other, one incident of which was that of Colonel Belknap, of the Union Side, reaching over the works, seizing the Colonel of the forty-fifth Alabama, and drawing him over the breastworks making him a prisoner of war.

About 4 P. M. Cheatham's Corps were ordered by Hood to again attack; they directed their assault this time to the front of the Fifteenth Corps, using the Decatur wagon road and railway as a guide, and came forward in solid masses, meeting no success until they slipped through the rear of the Fifteenth Corps by a deep cut used by the railway passing through our intrenchments.

As soon as they reached our rear, Lightburn's Division of the Fifteenth Corps, became partially panic stricken, and fell back, giving up the intrenchments for the whole front of this Division, the enemy capturing the celebrated Degress Battery of 20—pounders, and two guns in advance of our lines. The officers of Lightburn's Division rallied it in the line of intrenchments, just in the rear where they had moved from in the morning.

General Logan was then in command of the Army of the Tennessee. He rode over to where I was, and I sent Mercer's Brigade of the Second Division under the guidance of Major Edward Jonas, my A. D. C. to the aid of the Fifteenth Corps.

Of the performance of that brigade on that occasion, I quote the words of that staff officer, Major Jonas.

"I conducted Mercer's Brigade to the point where needed; arrived at the railroad, he at once deployed and charged, all men of the Fifteenth Corps at hand joining with him. Mercer's Brigade recaptured the works and the guns. Old Colonel M. was slightly wounded, and his celebrated horse "Billy" killed. By your direction I said to General Morgan L. Smith (temporarily in command of the Fifteenth Corps): General Dodge requests that you return this brigade at the earliest practicable moment, as there is every indication of renewed assault on our own line, and, after saying that your request would be respected, General Smith added: 'Tell General Dodge that his brigade (Mercer's) has done magnificently, and that it shall have full credit in my report.'" Afterwards one of Mercer's officers—Captain Boyd, I think—in trying his skill as an artillerist, cracked one of the recaptured guns. At the same moment of Mercer's attack in front General Woods' Division of Fifteenth Army Corps under the eye of General Sherman attacked the confederates occupying our intrenchments in flank and Williamson's Brigade joined Mercer's in recapturing our line and the batteries—the Fourth Iowa Infantry taking a conspicuous part.

In this battle Colonel Mercer and many of his men whom he so gallantly led had served their time, and were awaiting transportation home. Eloquent words have been written and spoken all over the land in behalf of the honor, of the bravery of the soldier, but where is the word spoken or written that can say more for the soldier than the

action of these men on that field? They were out of service, they had written that they were coming home, and their eyes and hearts were toward the North; many an anxious eye was looking for the boy who voluntarily laid down his life that day; and many a devoted father, mother or sister has had untold trouble to obtain recognition in the war department because the soldier's time had expired; he was mustered out, waiting to go home, and was not known on the records; but on that day he fought on three different parts of the field, without a thought except for his cause and his country.

The continuous attacks of Cheatham made no other impression on the line. Our men were behind the intrenchments and the slaughter of the enemy was something fearful. General J. C. Brown who commanded the Confederate Division that broke through our line told me that after breaking through it was impossible to force his men forward, the fire on their flanks and front was so terrific that when driven out of the works one-half of his command was killed, wounded or missing. The Confederate records sustain this and it is a wonder that they could force their line so often up to within 100 to 300 feet of us where our fire would drive them back, in spite of the efforts of their officers, a great many of whom fell in these attacks.

I could see the terrific fighting at Leggetts Hill, but along the line of the Fifteenth Corps, I can only speak of as shown by the records, and as told me by General John C. Brown of the Confederate Army. The stubborness and coolness with which they contested every inch of the ground won his admiration, and the manner and method with which the line was retaken, must have been seen to be appreciated.

When dark fell upon us the enemy had retired, except around the angle in the Seventeenth Corps, known as Leggett's or Bald Hill. Here there was a continuous fire, desultory and at close quarters, the enemy in places occupying ground close up to our intrenchments and to relieve these men of the Seventeenth Army Corps holding this angle who were worn out, at the request of General Blair I sent two regiments of Mercer's Brigade. They crawled in on their hands and knees, and swept the enemy from that front.

The whole of Hood's Army except Stewart's Corps, was thrown into our rear upon the flank and the front of the Army of the Tennessee, and after fighting from mid-day until dark were repulsed and driven back, and that Army held or commanded the entire battle-field demonstrating the fact that the Army of the Tennessee alone was able and competent to meet and defeat Hood's entire Army. The battle fell almost entirely upon the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Corps and two Divisions of the Fifteenth Corps, three Brigades of the Sixteenth being absent. The attack of the enemy was made along this line some seven times, and they were seven times repulsed.

We captured 18 stands of colors—5,000 stands of arms—2,017 prisoners. We lost in killed and wounded 3,521 men—10 pieces of artillery, and over 1,800 men mostly from Blair's Corps, were taken prisoners. The enemy's dead reported as buried in front of the different Corps was over 2,000 and the enemy's total loss in killed, wounded and prisoners was 8,000.

The criticism has often been made of this battle that with two armies idle that day, one the Army of the Ohio, (two thirds as large as the Army of the Tennessee) the other the Army of the Cumberland, (the largest of all Sherman's Armies), why we did not enter Atlanta. General Sherman urged Thomas to make the attack, Thomas' answer was, that the enemy were in full force behind his intrenchments, the fact was Stewarts Corps was guarding that front but General Schofield urged Sherman to allow him to throw his Army upon Cheatham's flank, and endeavor to roll up the Confederate line and so interpose between Atlanta and Cheatham's Corps which was so persistently attacking the Fifteenth and Seventeenth Corps from the Atlanta front. Sherman whose anxiety had been very great, seeing how successfully we were meeting the attack, his face relaxing into a pleasant smile said, to Schofield, "Let the Army of the Tennessee fight it out this time." This flank attack of Schofield on Cheatham would have no doubt cleared our front facing Atlanta intrenchments but Stewart was ready with his three Divisions and the Militia to hold the Atlanta intrenchments.

General Sherman in speaking of this battle always regretted that he did not allow Schofield to attack as he suggested and also force the fighting on Thomas' front, but no doubt the loss of McPherson really took his attention from everything except the Army of the Tennessee.

At about 10 o'clock on the night of the 22nd, the three corps commanders of the Army of the Tennessee (one of them in command of the army) met in the rear of the Fifteenth Corps, on the line of the Decatur road under an oak tree, and there discussed the results of the day, Blair's men were at the time in the trenches; in some places the enemy held one side and they the other; the men of the Fifteenth Corps were still in their own line, but tired and hungry, and those of the Sixteenth were, after their hard day's fight, busy throwing up intrenchments on the field they had held and won. It was thought that the Army of the Cumberland and the Army of the Ohio, which had not been engaged that day, should send a force to relieve Blair, and Dodge being the junior corps commander, was dispatched by General Logan, at the requests of Generals Logan and Blair, to see General Sherman. My impression is that I met him in a tent; I have heard it said that he had

Corps was attacked. Fuller gives the time of attack upon him as 12.30. By reading all of page 243 you will get a full and clear idea of time and everything The time was also taken by my staff and record made of it, and that agrees with Strong. This only shows how far apart officers can get in a great battle on time, and on many things, unless correct data is made of record on the spot.

On page 484 of vol. 14 to 16 of Society of Army of Tennessee records General Leggett says: "Both divisions of the Sixteenth Army Corps immediately became hotly engaged, etc., etc. Just at this time I espied General McPherson upon the high ground in the immediate rear of General Fuller's command, and sent Captain John B. Raymond of my staff to inquire of General McPherson the expediency of having General Giles A. Smith and myself change our line so as to face south, and at the same time I sent Captain George W. Porter to ascertain whether or not the left of General Smith and the right of General Fuller were sufficiently near together to antagonize any force seeking entrance there." He further says: "The enemy in front of the Sixteenth Corps rallied in the woods (this is after the first attack) and renewed their attack with increased vigor and bitterness, etc., etc. The conflict continued for some time with no appearance on either side of any disposition to yield the ground, when the enemy gave way, and fell back in confusion, followed by the Sixteenth Corps." He also says: "The second assault (upon the Sixteenth Corps) was simultaneous with the attack upon General Giles A. Smith's division, which was the left of the Seventeenth Corps."

You will note from my address, that the moment I was attacked I sent an aide, and afterwards a signal officer, named Sheffly, I think, who was detailed with me that day, or happened to be with me. These officers had gone to General Giles A. Smith, who commanded Blair's left, Fourth Division, Seventeenth Corps, to get him to refuse his lelt and join my right. I think the first officer I sent was Captain Jonas of my staff, who returned immediately to me, and General Giles A. Smith sent me word that he would refuse. That was a long time before Cleburn's division got between us, but as my paper and your article show, McPherson had sent word without knowing the condition in front of Giles A. Smith to hold his position, and he would send reinforcements to fill the gap between Fuller and himself. Of course had McPherson been there earlier and seen what I saw, he would have had Smith's left join my right immediately, which would have put Cleburn in front of us, instead of between us. That is one of the things that occur in battle that the person on the ground knows better than the one distant. It was on the third attack on my line hat the enemy struck Blair, as Strong did not go to Blair until after

the repulse of the second attack. Cleburn's force got right in behind Blair's left, and picked up that portion of his line that was refused, and swept back his force so that Blair's left, even before Waglin of the Fifteenth Corps got there was pretty nearly an extension of but a quarter of a mile away from Fuller's right, and after I got through fighting I had to withdraw my entire right quite a distance to connect with Waglin and Blair, such line as Cleburn's force had pressed clear beyond me and before he was halted was way in the rear of my right,

After the second attack Cleburn, as he pressed through the gap between Fuller and Smith, forced Fuller to change front and use part of his force to protect his flank, and the Sixty-fourth Illinois in this movement captured the skirmish line that killed McPherson, taking from them his field-glass, orders and other papers that they had taken from McPherson's body, and later in the day I sent these to General Sherman. See report Sixty-fourth Illinois volume 38, part 3, War Records, page 494. Fuller's maps, page 480, volume 38, part 3, War Records, show were Fuller fought, and where we had to intrench.

Where I stood in my line I could see the entire Confederate force, and all of my own, something that very seldom occurs, and of course, the scene as Blair states was a magnificent one. I saw Fuller do a most gallant act. I sent an aide to him with instructions to charge, but before he got there Walker's division broke the center of Fuller's Brigade, his own regiment, the Twenty-seventh Ohio, falling back. I saw Fuller get down off his horse, grab the colors of the Twenty-seventh, rush to the front with them in his hands and called upon his regiment to come to the colors, and they rallied and saved his front. It was but a moment later that I saw Walker, who commanded the division that was attacking Fuller, fall from his horse, and the division broke and went into the woods. The action of Fuller was very gallant, and has been painted, and I have a copy of the painting in my room.

Blair in his report has this to say of the fighting, which shows that he watched us a long time before he was attacked, and if you will read his report carefully, you will see that it bears out my statements in full. Blair says: "I started to go back to my command and witnessed the fearful assault made on the Sixteenth Army Corps, and its prompt and gallant repulse by that command. It was a most fortunate circumstance for the whole army that the Sixteenth Army Corps occupied the position I have attempted to describe at the moment of attack, and although it does not belong to me to report upon the bearing and conduct of the officers and men of that corps, still I cannot withhold my expression of admiration for the manner in which this command met and repulsed the repeated and persistent attacks

of the enemy. The attack upon our flank was made by the whole of Hardee's corps."

I speak in my address of Mercer's brigade fighting on three parts of the field. Mercer after helping to retake the Decatur road line, camped right in the rear of the Fifteenth Corps, and did not come back to me. When Logan, Blair and myself met that evening, Blair asked Logan for some help to go up to relieve troops at Bald Hill. Logan, seeing Mercer's brigade there, ordered me to send it up. They went up there and crawled in and relieved the men on Bald Hill. This was very late in the night, and even then fresh men coming in drove out or captured what men there were still lying on the enemy's side of the intrenchments. Mercer never made a report of this battle. You will see by my paper that he was virtually out of the service, awaiting transportation home, but he went in with his regiment the same as though they were still in the service. He was a German, and I do not suppose he knew the importance of reporting, and it was only a short time after that I had to leave that army, therefore did not follow it up, and I find no report of Mercer or of the Ninth Illinois, but I think the regimental reports of the Eighty-first Ohio give all these facts. See War Records volume 38, part 3, page 463, and report Second Brigade, Second Division Sixteenth Army Corps, volume 38, part 3, page 450.

In my address I did not go much into detail, but I have all the data of this battle compiled, and intend some day to put it in shape, but I give you enough so you can, after examining the reports of Blair and the others, make your article historically correct. Most of it is correct and well-stated, but I know you want to get the dates and movements at the left on such an occasion so full that they will stand criticism, as the Battle of Atlanta was the great battle of that campaign.

Your article and many others that I have seen assumes that it was a part of Hardee's Corps that struck Blair's front—that is his front that was towards Atlanta, but that is not so. Cleburn's Division was the left division of Hardee's Corps. There were three other divisions, Maney's, (Cheatham's old division) Bate's and Walker's. Walker was the next to Cleburn and attacked Fuller. Bate and Maney struck Sweeney. Cleburn's Division was in front of Blair after Cleburn had driven back his left and he had refused it from Leggett's Hill towards my right. What saved Blair was that Cheatham, who commanded Hood's old Corps, whose orders were to attack Blair's front at the same time Hardee struck his rear, in accordance with the plans of both Hood and Hardee, did not attack because Hardee struck me, which was a surprise to them as well as to me, and when Cheatham got ready

to attack Blair's front, hitting Leggett's Division and on down the Fifteenth Corps, two divisions, Bate's and Walker's, had been whipped, and were virtually out of the fight, because after the third attack upon me, and my breaking up of one of their columns so badly, they did not come again in any force. They went back to the road on the ridge, just south of and parallel to my line. I forget the name of the road, but it was the one that led off to Decatur, and there they intrenched, and when I pushed forward my skirmishers I found them in force. Between 3 and 4 o'clock Maney's Division left my front and went around to help Cleburn.

There have also been many statements that in the first attack two Divisions of Hardee's Corps struck the Sixteenth Corps and two the Seventeenth Blair's. This is not correct. Three Divisions struck my Corps, and one Division, Cleburn's, struck Blair's Corps, and caught his left and rear, but after the third attack on my front Maney's Division was sent around to join Cleburn, and joined in the fiercest attack of the day about 4 P. M. upon Leggett's and Smith's Divisions after their line had been refused and formed almost at right angles at Leggett's Hill, and reaching out towards me, with Waglin's Brigade on their left. From all accounts this attack was a fearful one, Maney's men reaching and holding the outside of the intrenchments that were occupied by Blair's men. This line faced almost due south and both forces fought there off and on until about 7 P. M., some of the enemy remaining in the outside intrenchments until Mercer's Brigade of the Sixteenth Corps went in at near midnight to support that line.

Again many records have it that Blair was forced back early in the battle. This is a mistake, as his 4th Division, commanded by General Giles A. Smith, which was on the extreme left held most of his original intrenched line until between 3 and 4 o'clock, when the attack of Cheatham from the Atlanta side forced them to take a new position to keep them from being crushed by Cleburn in the rear and Cheatham's attack from the Atlanta front.

There is another thing that does not seem to be fully understood, and that is that when Blair got his left refused so as to face Maney and Cleburn in his front they were unable to gain any headway on him in their attacks. In fact, they suffered great loss, and they only damaged Blair when they got in behind his left. Blair had three regiments there refused at right angles to his front, and it was a portion of two of these regiments that Cleburn picked up. Blair lost nearly all his prisoners from Giles A. Smith's Division, when Cleburn swept down through the gap and got right in behind them before they knew any body was on them. In fact, Blair's men had to turn around and fight towards their rear, and as I have stated, Cleburn got past

Fuller's right and commenced shooting into his flank. Just after Walker was killed there was a lull, and Fuller turned two regiments right into Cleburn's main line, and, as Captain Allen of the Signal Corps, says, and my records show, captured that skirmish line that killed McPherson and brought it in.

To show McPherson's feeling about Blair's left flank, I sent Fuller's command to that flank the night before on a request from McPherson, who felt anxious about Blair's position, that flank being in the air, but Blair camped Fuller near where he opened the battle in the rear of the Seventeenth Corps instead of connecting his left with it. They camped about a quarter of a mile to his rear and a little back from his extreme left. Blair, no doubt, thought that would protect him, as well as put them in line, but he took one of my batteries (Murray's) and put it in his front line. Now this battery was on the way from Blair to report to me, coming down just as McPherson was going up the road, and the same skirmish line that killed McPherson killed the horses of that battery and captured a portion of the men, and McPherson really almost fell upon the limber of one of the guns. This was Murray's United States Battery of four pieces. I do not know as I have seen this mentioned in any of the reports, unless it is in mine, but these are the facts of the matter. That is the way a battery of my corps was reported lost or captured by the enemy, It was passing from Blair to myself, and not captured in line of battle or fighting, as a great many have stated and supposed to be the case.

In your article you speak of Logan taking a part of the Sixteenth Corps and leading it, as though it was right on my front, and then speak of him as leading a portion of the Fifteenth Corps that had been broken through on the Decatur road back into position. The facts are that it was about 4 o'clock in the afternoon when Logan came to me and asked me to send any force I had free to help retake the line that General John C. Brown's Division had broken through the Fifteenth Corps. I sent Mercer's brigade of the second division, and with it sent Captain Jonas of my staff. (See his statement copied in my address). Logan followed with the command, and it double-quicked the whole distance without stopping. As soon as it got there it found Lightburn's Division drifted back but holding behind the trees their line, the enemy in possession of DeGresse's Battery, and as Mercer's Brigade went in on the front Williamson's Brigade of Wood's Division, which Sherman had directed to make a flank charge, was moving, and they both reached the works together. The men of Mercer's Brigade got hold of DeGresse's guns (see report of 81st Ill.) and turned them on the enemy. There has always been a contest between these two brigades as to which got there first, but that does

not matter, for they got in together and retook the line. General J. C. Brown, who commanded the Confederate Division, was with me afterwards for many years on the Texas and Pacific Railway, and has given me a full account of his attack, and the fury with which he was forced out by this movement from the flank by Wood and the direct assault by Mercer. Mercer in going in had his horse killed under him.

Fighting along the Fifteenth Corps came late, and was all pretty much after the fighting on my front was over, because when General Logan came to me for aid I was intrenching the new line made by the refusal of Blair's left, and took Mercer's Brigade right out of my front to go with him. The fact is I did not happen to have a single man in reserve. Every man I had on the field was in line from the commencement of the fighting. Sweeney's Division stood right up in the road it was marching on, and the two batteries were in the center of his division; the position was a very strong one. If I had had plenty of time to select a position I could not have found a stronger one. It was the first time I ever saw such execution done by artillery. They used canister against those columns with terrible effect.

To show you how small a thing will sometimes change the prospects in a battle, one of Hardee's Divisions coming towards me got entangled in something—at that time I could not tell what—but on going to the ground afterwards I found that it was a mill pond, that exposed the flank of Maney's Division that was next to Walker's. Seeing this I rode down to Mercer and told him to take his brigade and charge right into it, which he did. It was quite a time before I could tell what the result was, but I soon saw prisoners coming back and knew then that Mercer had them. He had that division at a great disadvantage, and captured a great many prisoners out of it and several battle flags. See report 2nd Brigade, 2nd Division Sixteenth Army Corps, vol. 38, part 3, page 450 Army Records. That charge, no doubt, saved my line, because I had a very thin line, and with the most of Hardee's Corps coming at me in double column, as it was, I have no doubt that if it had reached me it would have given me trouble, but they never got to me on any of their attacks. We were fortunate enough to break them before they could reach the line, though on Fuller's front they were right up to it when Walker fell.

There was a great dispute between Hood and Hardee about this movement to the rear, Hood claiming that Hardee should have reached there early in the morning, while Hardee claimed he did not receive the order in time to get there before he did—a very fortunate fact for us, for if he had reached the rear of the Seventeenth and Fifteenth Corps, and Cheatham and Stewart had attacked in the front, it would have been rough times for the old Army of the Tennessee, but no

doubt they would have come out of it with honor in some way.

I think there is no doubt about the time McPherson was killed—it was just about two hours after the battle had opened. Of course there are all kinds of time given, but the fact of the stopping of the watch of the signal officer, Sheffly, when he fell against the tree at two minutes past two, is almost conclusive evidence. See his statement vol. 11-13, page 242, records Society Army of the Tennessee. You can judge of that yourself, because even before McPherson got up to my right, where he stood, as Strong says, watching me, I had been fighting some time, for he had to ride from near Sherman's headquarters up there, a distance of two to three miles. If you will read carefully the address I am sending you, and the report Blair made, also the address of Strong, I think you will come to the same conclusions I give you. An article on the death of General McPherson by W. W. Allen, of San Diego, California, Signal Officer of the Army of the Tennessee, appeared in an issue of the National Tribune some time this year, but of what date I do not know. It goes to prove the time and the hour McPherson was killed, and the capture of the skirmish line that killed him. Of course a great many of the official reports are misleading as to time, and it is only by these circumstances that we can judge definitely. I notice it was 12:20 o'clock, according to Allen, when they first heard the rattle of musketry and artillery.

When you have read Allen's article please return it to me. I will be very glad to give you any further information you may need if it is possible for me to do so.

Truly and cordially yours,

GRENVILLE M. DODGE,

GENERAL GREEN B. RAUM,
Chicago, Ill.

EXECUTION

OF THE

CONFEDERATE SPY SAMUEL DAVIS,

At PULASKI TENN, NOVENBER, 1863.

NEW YORK, June 15th, 1897.

To the Editor of "The Confederate Veteran."

In fulfillment of my promise to give you my recollections of Sam Davis (who was hung as a spy in November, 1863, at Pulaski, Tenn.) I desire to say that writing of matters which occured 34 years ago, one is apt to make mistakes as to minor details, but the principal facts were such that they impressed themselves upon my mind so that I can speak of them with some certainty.

When General Grant ordered General Sherman (whose head of column was near Eastport, on Tennessee River) to drop everything and bring his army to Chattanooga, my corps (the Sixteenth) was then located at Corinth, Miss., and I brought up the rear.

General Grant's anxiety to attack Bragg's command before Longstreet could return from East Tennessee brought on the battle before I could reach Chattanooga. General Grant, therefore, instructed General Sherman to halt my command in Middle Tennessee and to instruct me to rebuild the railway from Nashville to Decatur. The fulfilling of above order is fully set forth by General Grant in his Memoirs.

When I reached the line of the Nashville and Decatur railroad, I distributed my troops from Columbia south towards Athens, Alabama. I had about 10,000 men and 8,000 animals and was without provisions, with no railroad or water communication to any basis of supply, and

was obliged to draw subsistence for my command from the adjacent country until I could rebuild the railroad and receive my supplies from Nashville.

My command was a part of the "Army of the Tennessee," occupying temporarily a portion of the territory of the "Department of the Cumberland," but not reporting or subject to the commander of that department.

Upon an examination of the country, I found that there was an abundance of everything needed to supply my command, except where Sherman's forces had swept across it along Elk River. He wrote me "I do not think that my forces have left a chicken for you." I also found that I was in a country where the sentiment of the people was almost unanimously against us. I had very little faith in converting them by the taking of the oath of allegiance; I therefore issued an order, stating that the products of the country I required to supply my command, and to all who had these products, regardless of their sentiments, who would bring them to the stations where my troops were located, I would pay a fair price for them, but if I had to send and bring the supplies myself, that I should take them without making payment, giving them only receipts; and also issued instructions that every train going for supplies should be accompanied by an officer and receipt given for what he took. This had a good effect, the citizens generally bringing in their supplies to my command and receiving the proper voucher, but it also gave an opportunity for straggling bands to rob and charge up their depredations to my command. This caused many complaints to be filed with the military governor of Tennessee and the department commander of the Cumberland.

Upon investigation, I found most of those depredations were committed by irresponsible parties of both sides, and I also discovered that there was a well organized and disciplined corps of scouts and spies within my lines, one force operating to the east of the line, under Captain Coleman, and another force operating to the west, having its headquarters in the vicinity of Florence, Alabama. I issued orders to my own spies to locate these parties, sending out scouting parties to wipe them out or drive them across the Tennessee River.

My cavalry had considerable experience in this work in and around Corinth, and they were very successful and brought in many prisoners, most of whom could only be treated as prisoners of war.

The Seventh Kansas Cavalry was very efficient in this service, and they captured Samuel Davis, Joshua Brown, Smith and General Bragg's Chief of Scouts and Secret Service Colonel S. Shaw, all about the same time. We did not know of the importance of the capture of Shaw, or that he was the Captain Coleman commanding Bragg's secret

service force. Nothing was found on any of the prisoners of importance, except upon Davis, who evidently had been selected to carry the information they had all obtained through to General Bragg. Upon Davis were found letters from Captain Coleman, the commander of the scouts to the east of us, and many others. I was very anxious to capture Coleman and break up his command, as my own scouts and spies within the Confederate line were continually reporting to us the news sent south from and the movements of Coleman within my lines.

Davis was brought immediately to me, as his captors knew his importance. They believed he was an officer and also knew he was a member of Coleman's command.

When brought to my office I met him pleasantly. I knew what had been found upon him and I desired to locate Coleman and his command and ascertain, if possible, who was furnishing the information, which I saw was accurate and valuable to General Bragg.

Davis met me modestly. He was a fine, soldierly-looking young man, dressed in a faded Federal soldier's coat, one of our army soft hats and top boots. He had a frank, open face, which was inclined to brightness. I tried to impress upon him the danger he was in, and that I knew he was only a messenger, and held out to him the hope of lenient treatment if he would answer truthfully, as far as he could, my questions.

He listened attentively and respectfully to me, but, as I recollect, made no definite answer, and I had him returned to the prison. My recollection is that Captain Armstrong, my Provost Marshal, placed in the prison with him and the other prisoners one of our own spies, who claimed to them to be one of the Confederate scouting parties operating within my lines, and I think the man More whom the other prisoners speak of as having been captured with them and escaping, was this man. However, they all kept their own counsel and we obtained no information of value from them.

The reason of this reticence, was the fact that they all knew Colonel Shaw was one of our captives, and that if his importance was made known to us he would certainly be hung, and they did not think that Davis would be executed.

Upon Davis was found a large mail of value. Much of it was letters from the friends and relatives of soldiers in the Confederate Army. There were many small presents, one or two, I remember, to General Bragg, and much accurate information of my forces, of our defences, our intentions, substance of my orders, criticisms as to my treatment of the citizens and a general approval of my payment for supplies, while a few denounced severely some of the parties who had hauled in supplies under the orders.

Captain Coleman mentioned this in one of his letters.

There were also intimations of the endeavor that would be made to interrupt my work, and plans for the capture of single soldiers and small parties of the command out after forage.

I had Davis brought before me again, after my Provost Marshal had reported his inability to obtain anything of value from him. I then informed him that he would be tried as a spy; that the evidence against him would surely convict him, and made a direct appeal to him to give me the information I knew he had. He very quietly, but firmly, refused to do it. I therefore let him be tried and suffer the consequences. Considerable interest was taken in young Davis by the Provost Marshal and Chaplain Young, and considerable pressure was brought to bear upon them by some of the citizens of Pulaski; and I am under the impression that some of them saw Davis and endeavored to induce him to save himself, but they failed. Mrs. John A. Jackson, I remember, made a personal appeal in his behalf directly to me. Davis was convicted upon trial and sentenced. Then one of my noted scouts, known as "Chickasaw," believed that he could prevail upon Davis to give the information we asked.

He took him in hand and never gave it up until the last moment, going to the scaffold with a promise of pardon a few moments before his execution.

Davis died to save his own chief, Colonel Shaw, who was in prison with him and was captured the same day.

The parties who were prisoners with Davis have informed me that it was Shaw who had selected Davis as the messenger to General Bragg, and had given to him part of his mail and papers.

I did not know this certainly until a long time after the war. I first learned of it by rumor and what some of my own scouts have told me since the war, and it has since been confirmed confidentially to me by one of the prisoners who was captured about the same time that Davis was and who was imprisoned with him up to the time he was convicted and sentenced, and knew Colonel Shaw, as well as all the facts in the case.

The statement made to me is, that Colonel S. Shaw was the chief or an important officer in General Bragg's Secret Service Corps; that Shaw had furnished the important documents to Davis, and that their captors did not know Shaw and his importance.

Colonel Shaw I sent with the other prisoners North, as prisoners of war. I also learned that Shaw was greatly alarmed when he was informed I was trying to induce Davis to give me the information he had.

This is where Davis showed himself a true soldier. He had been

entrusted with an important commission by an important officer, who was imprisoned with him, and died rather than betray him. He knew to a certainty, if he informed me of the facts, that Shaw would be executed, for he was a far more important person to us than was Davis.

During the war I had many spies captured; some executed, who were captured within the Confederate lines and who were equally brave in meeting their fate.

By an extraordinary effort I saved the life of one who was captured by Forrest. Through my efforts this man escaped, though General Forrest sized him up correctly. He was one of the most important men we ever had within the Confederate lines.

Forrest was determined to hang him, but Major-General Polk believed him innocent and desired to save him.

Great interest was taken in Davis at the time, because it was known by all of the command that I desired to save him.

Your publication bears many evidences of this fact. It is not, therefore, necessary for me to state that I regretted to see sentence executed; but it was one of the fates of war, which is cruelty itself, and there is no refining it.

I find this letter bearing upon the case; it may be of interest. It is my first report to Major B. M. Sawyer, Assistant Adjutant-General, Army of the Tennessee, notifying him of the capture of Davis. It is dated, Pulaski, Tenn., November 20th, 1863, and is as follows:

> "I herewith inclose a copy of dispatches taken from one of Bragg's spies. He had a heavy mail, papers, etc., and shows Captain Coleman is pretty well posted.
>
> We have broken up several bands of mounted robbers and Confederate cavalry in the last week, capturing some five commissioned officers and one hundred enlisted men, who have been forwarded.
>
> I also forward a few of the most important letters found in the mail. The tooth brushes and blank-books I was greatly in need of and therefore appropriated them. I am,
>
> Very respectfully, your obedient servant,
>
> G. M. DODGE,
>
> *Brigadier-General.*"

The severe penalty of death, where a spy is captured, is not because there is anything dishonorable in the fact of the person being a spy, as only men of peculiar gifts for such service, men of courage and cool judgment and undoubted patriotism are selected. The fact that the information they obtain is found within their enemy's lines

and probably of great danger to an army is what causes the penalty to be so very severe. A soldier caught in the uniform, or a part of the uniform of his enemy, within his enemy's lines, establishes the fact that he is a spy and is there in violation of the Articles of War and for no good purpose. This alone will prohibit his being treated as a prisoner of war, when caught as Davis was in our uniform, with valuable documents upon him, and seals his fate.

I appreciate fully that the people of Tennessee and Davis' comrades understand his soldierly qualities and propose to honor his memory. I take pleasure in aiding in raising the monument to his memory, although the services he performed were for the purpose of injuring my command, but given in faithfully performing the duties he was assigned to. I am

Truly and respectfully,

GRENVILLE M. DODGE,

Major-General

BANQUET IN HONOR OF

GENERAL O. O. HOWARD,

ON REACHING HIS 70th BIRTHDAY,

Toast:

General O. O. Howard, as Commander of the Army of the Tennessee.

Response by Major General Grenville M. Dodge.

Mr. Chairman:

After the great battle of Atlanta, July 22nd, 1864. in which the Army of the Tennessee lost its distinguished and greatly beloved commander, General McPherson, General Sherman had the delicate and difficult task to perform of selecting a new commander for that army, which had furnished to the war Generals Grant, Sherman and McPherson. General Logan, the commander of the Fifteenth Army Corps, fell to the command of the army by reason of seniority of rank, and he finished successfully the greatest battle of that campaign, and naturally expected to receive the permanent command of that army. In an address to the Society of the Army of the Tennessee, General Sherman gives his reasons for the selection he made in the following language.

"In the midst of that battle General McPherson was killed; and I, "the common commander of the whole, ordered instantly General "Logan, the senior, to assume command of the Army of the Tennessee, "and to go on to complete the orders given to General McPherson. "I complimented him personally on the field; no man ever questioned "his patriotism, valor or ability in action, and he had good reason to "expect the succession. The lawful right to appoint a successor to "McPherson vested in President Lincoln, but he may have acted "solely on my advice; I am willing to assume the whole responsibility.

"The science of war is not modern; it is as old as time and like most

"sciences has resolved itself into three parts: Logistics, grand strategy "and combat, each essential to success. General Logan was perfect "in combat, but entertained and expressed a species of contempt for "the other branches; whereas a general, who undertakes a campaign "without the forethought and preparation involved in logistics will "fail as surely as the mechanic who ignores the law of gravitation. "After consulting with my trusted commanders, I recommended "General Howard to succeed McPherson. General Howard had been "a corps commander reduced to a division commander by the con- "solidation of the Eleventh and Twelfth Corps into the Twentieth. "He fought with the Army of the Tennessee at Missionary Ridge, "went with us up to Knoxville, every day was with us to July 22nd, "when McPherson was killed, and was, by the only legal authority of "our Government, appointed to command the Army of the Tennessee, "and I bear Logan's memory in the greater honor because he sub- "mitted with soldierly grace and demeanor."

General Sherman had many distinguished soldiers to select from that were officers of his great army of over one hundred thousand men, and it seems to me that a greater compliment could not have been paid to a soldier than Sherman gave General Howard when he assigned him to the command of the most successful army of the war.

After the battle of Atlanta, General Sherman determined to swing the Army of the Tennessee from the extreme left to the extreme right, with a view of finally moving to the south of Atlanta and planting his army upon General Hood's communications. In this movement my corps, the Sixteenth, being the extreme left of the Army of the Tennessee, was the first to pull out, and naturally would be the first to go into line. It was about noon on July 27th, 1864, when the head of my column reached the right flank of General Thomas' Army of the Cumberland, on which I was to join, and where I for the first time met General Howard. One of my divisions was delayed and was not up, and General Howard appeared to me to be notably annoyed, and expressed himself to me in a way that made it evident that he was fearful I would not get into line on time. I explained to him the reason of the delay to my second division, which was unavoidable. He made no comment, but seeing his great anxiety I made a special effort and soon got into line, before Blair's and Logan's Corps got up, and he showed plainly his astonishment and satisfaction when I reported to him that I was in line and partially intrenched. Blair went partially into line that night, but Logan did not get in until the next morning, when the enemy attacked him with great force, and the battle of Ezra Church was fought. The enemy always called it the "killing" of Ezra Church. They charged Logan's lines seven or eight times,

and were driven back with great slaughter. General Howard allowed General Logan to fight this battle without interference, although he was on the field under fire, alert, and watching every movement, and where our men could see him. In his report he gave all the credit for the victory to General Logan. After the battle General Howard passed along our lines on foot so that the men could see him. He had a kindly word for them, and his calmness, self-possession and action that day placed him in accord with our army, and he gained its respects and confidence, and from that day to the end of the war he was a part of us.

General Sherman tried all expedients, by calvalry raids, by temporarialy breaking Hood's line of supply, to force him to evacuate Atlanta, but saw that he must plant his army permanently upon Hood's commnnications, therefore, General Howard, with the Army of the Tennessee, swung clear of Atlanta, pushed south, striking the enemy at Jonesboro, the rest of the army following, and in a day or two Sherman was enabled to send his dispatch, "Atlanta is ours and fairly won."

My service with General Howard was short, for on August 19th, I was given a Confederate leave, and did not return to duty until November. I was greatly disappointed when I learned I was not to serve again under General Howard, although I was assigned to a larger and more important command. Still I preferred to remain and take my old command in the army that I had served with, and shared its trials and fortunes for three years. I had reported for duty before I had fully recovered in order to be with it in the campaigns which I knew were about to take place in the march to the sea, but Sherman did not consider me equal to the hard work before him.

The operations of Sherman's Army, sixty-five thousand strong, with General Howard commanding the right wing and General Slocum its left wing, in its march to Savannah, thence through the Carolinas to Raleigh, and the surrender of Johnston, gave General Howard an opportunity to exhibit those qualites that General Sherman declared were necessary in an army commander. General Howard's command took part in the battles and engagements of McAlister, Griswoldsville, Riser's, Brinaker's Bridges, Orangeburg, Congaree Creek, Columbia, Cheraw, Fayetteville, Averysboro and Bentonville. His army had a confidence in itself that made it almost invincible, and Sherman, who considered that this campaign, so bold, so aggressive and so successful, would be considered in future years as the one achievement of his life that would determine his standing as a great commander, said to me that General Howard's ability, subordination, comprehension and carrying out of his plans had fully justified his selection of him as the commander of the Army of the Tennessee.

It is well known that General Sherman was desirous of recognizing General Logan's loyalty and action, and the manner in which he accepted the orders relieving him of the command of the Army of the Tennessee, in some noted manner, and the opportunity offered after the surrender of General Johnston, when the army in its march was nearing Washington, and he asked General Howard to accept another command, in order that General Logan might have the satisfaction and honor of commanding the Army of the Tennessee during its march and review in Washington. General Howard, in his good heart, readily acquiesced, although it must have been a great disappointment to him, for he had successfully commanded the army in several battles and been with it day and night from the time he took command until the end of the war. In describing this review General Sherman said: "When I reached the Treasury Department building and looked back the sight was simply magnificent. The column was compact, and the glittering muskets looked like a solid mass of steel moving with the regularity of a pendulum;" and he said it was the happiest and proudest moment of his life. For this reason the Army of the Tennessee, with the aid of the Government, is erecting a monument to General Sherman's honor and memory right at this spot.

It is a suggestive fact that when war with Spain was declared the four sons of the commanders of the Army of the Tennessee took part in it. They were General Frederick D. Grant, Father Thomas E. Sherman, Colonel Guy Howard, (who was in the regular service), and Major John A. Logan, Jr. They have all been an honor to their fathers and credit to their country. Three of them were members of the Society of the Army of the Tennessee, and I was personally acquainted with all of them. Two of them, Colonel Guy Howard and Major John A. Logan, fell in battle in the Philippines, in the line of their duty, and they were most honored, loved and praised by those who knew them best,—their comrades in the service. When Colonel Howard was killed I wrote General Howard, my old commander, a kindly letter, to try, if I could, to lift a part of the burden from his mind. When he came to New York he called to see me, and what he said greatly impressed me. When he came into my office with tears in his eyes, but brave in his great sorrow, he said: "Dodge, although it is hard to bear, you and I have no right to complain. It is what we have been educated to, and what we might expect and must always be prepared to meet." Everyone must appreciate this faith, christian fortitude and soldierly example, which was equal to the great qualities he always exhibited on the battle field.

In 1867, speaking of what the private soldier had accomplished in the war, General Howard uttered this sentiment. "God grant that

what he planted, nourished, and has now preserved by his blood—I mean *American liberty*—may be a plant to us as the apple of the eye, and that its growth may not be hindered till its roots are firmly set in every State of the Union, and till the full fruition of its blessed fruit is realized by men of every name, color and description, in this broad land." This sentiment seems to have been his guiding star in all his walks since the war, and it must be a great satisfaction to him on this, his seventieth birthday, to see how completely his sentiment has been fulfilled.

My relations with General Howard were renewed soon after the war. Circumstances brought us often together, and the liking I formed for him before Atlanta grew into a close friendship that has been of great benefit to me. There is no one who takes so great a pleasure in honoring General Howard as myself, and it is very gratifying to me to see this distinguished company, and note its respect and love for my old commander, comrade and friend, and while I congratulate you and him for the great work he has performed, my greatest pleasure is in bringing to him, as I do, as the President of the Society of the Army of the Tennessee, the congratulations of that army, its God-speed and its heart-felt prayers and wishes for his good health, long life and continued presence with us. Many of you may not appreciate what that means, but an old soldier like General Howard, who commanded that army so long, and who has looked every one of them in the eyes so many times, will properly prize and never forget it.

Perhaps it is expected that I should say something of the Army of the Tennessee, which General Howard so ably commanded, adding so much to its reputation and victories, but that is a subject so great that I will not even attempt to discuss it. In speaking of the services of that army, upon a similar occasion, General Grant paid this tribute to the Army of the Tennessee, and I will take it as mine.

"As an army, the Army of the Tennessee never sustained a single defeat during four years of war. Every fortification which it assailed surrendered; every force arrayed against it was either defeated, captured or destroyed; no officer was ever assigned to the command of that army who had afterwards to be relieved from it or reduced to another command. Such a history is not accident."

ADDRESS TO

SIXTEENTH ARMY CORPS,

DELIVERED AT THE

NATIONAL ENCAMPMENT G. A. R., Washington, D. C.,

October, 1902.

Comrades of the Sixteenth Army Corps:

The Sixteenth Army Corps was organized December 18th, 1862, and formed into two wings. General A. J. Smith commanded the right wing, and General G. M. Dodge the left wing of the corps. The left wing was organized with the corps, the right wing a year or more afterwards. The corps, as a body, was never together, though it probably took part in more widely separated fields than any other corps in the Army of the Tennessee. The right wing, under General Smith, was in the Vicksburg campaign, and after that it went to the Department of the Gulf, and was with General Banks in his movement up Red River, and saved that army from defeat; of this there is no doubt. After that, it was sent after Forest, and it was the only command that I know of that caught and whipped him. The left wing overtook General Forest at Town Creek in 1863, in its march to Decatur in the rear of Bragg's army, but he did not stay long enough for us to get a good fight out of him.

From the campaign after Forest, General Smith's command was sent to the Department of Missouri to drive out Price. There I found them in December, 1864, when I took command of that department, in a deplorable condition, without clothing, shoes, or camp equipage. Under an order from General Grant, I sent them to Nashville, with all the force in my department, some twenty thousand men all told, to help General Thomas, and I sent them everything they needed to clothe and equip them. You all remember how you were frozen in on the Mississippi, and had to take the cars. One of the pleasantest recollections of my life is that I received a letter from General Smith,

thanking me for appreciating their condition, and having in Nashville when they arrived everything they needed. He said that it was the first time they had been treated decently, and they were thankful they had fallen into the hands of someone who appreciated them.

At the battle of Nashville it was General Smith, with the right wing of the Sixteenth Corps, and the troops of the Department of the Missouri, that turned the left flank of Hood's army, and was practically in his rear when stopped, and I have heard many officers who were there say that if he had been let alone he would have captured or destroyed that wing of the army. Thus ended the eventful career of the right wing, and its fortunes were cast with the Army of the Cumberland in its chase after Hood.

The left wing was organized from the troops I commanded in the District of Corinth, and had in it the old Second Division of the Army of the Tennessee that Grant organized at Cairo, that fought at Belmont, Henry and Donelson, Shiloh and the two Corinths. It had on its banners "First at Donelson." I took command right after the battle of Corinth, where it had been censured by Rosecrans and praised by Grant for the part it took in the battle of Corinth. General Grant held us at Corinth as a protection to his communications while the campaign against Vicksburg was going on. In a letter to me he said he had left us there to protect that flank, for he knew that if Bragg endeavored to break that line we would stay, so you see he still had faith in his old division. From Corinth we marched with Sherman in his celebrated trip from Memphis to Chattanooga. We wintered on the line, and rebuilt the Nashville and Decatur Road, and in his Memoirs General Grant, after describing the condition of the army, and the necessity for rebuilding the railway from Nashville to Decatur, speaks thus of the work of the Sixteenth Army Corps.

"General Dodge had no tools to work with except those of the pioneer-axes, picks and spades. With these he was enabled to intrench his men, and protect them against surprise from small parties of the enemy, and, as he had no base of supplies until the road could be completed back to Nashville, the first matter to consider, after protecting his men, was the getting in of food and forage from the surrounding country. He had his men and teams bring in all the grain they could find, or all they needed, and all the cattle for beef, and such other food as could be found. Millers were detailed from the ranks to run the mills along the line of the army. Where they were not near enough to the troops for protection they were taken down and moved up to the line of the road. Blacksmith shops, with all the iron and steel found in them, were used up in like manner. Blacksmiths were detailed and set to work making the tools necessary

in railroad and bridge building. Axemen were at work getting out timber for bridges, and cutting fuel for locomotives and cars. Thus every branch of railroad building, making tools to work with, and supplying the workmen with food, was all going on at once, and without the aid of a mechanic or workman except what the command itself furnished. General Dodge had the work assigned to him finished within forty days after receiving his orders. The number of bridges to rebuild was 182, many of them over deep and wide chasms. The length of road repaired was 102 miles."

I only quote a small part of what General Grant says in this connection to show you that while the Sixteenth Corps had its share of fighting, and praise for it, still it was a corps that Grant called upon in an emergency, and when he wanted great deeds done, and proves not only what they could turn their hands to when necessary, but is also a sample of what our great army was made of.

In the spring of 1864 we became a part of the great army in the Atlanta campaign. When we arrived at Chattanooga on the 5th of May, I called at General Sherman's headquarters. General McPherson, our army commander was there. Sherman said to him: "You had better send Dodge to take Ship's Gap," McPherson said to him: "Why, General, that is thirty miles away, and Dodge's troops are not yet unloaded, and he has no transportation with him." Sherman said: "Let him try it, and have the transportation follow." We struck out, and that night at midnight Sprague's brigade of the Fourth Division of the Sixteenth Corps had gained the gap. The enemy appeared the next morning. This opened the way through Snake Creek Gap, planting us in the rear of Johnston's army, and forcing him to abandon his impregnable position at Dalton.

Our battles in the Atlanta campaign were those of the Army of the Tennessee. The left wing received continual commendation until the great battle of the 22nd, when it happened to be in the rear of our army, and received and defeated the celebrated movement of Hood to our rear. Sprague's brigade fought all day at Decatur, and saved our trains. In the battle of the 22nd of July, we had only five thousand men in line, but met and repulsed three divisions of Hardee's corps, and McPherson, who stood on our right and witnessed the fight, watching the charge of Fuller and Mersey, and the breaking of two of the enemy's columns, spoke of us in the highest terms, and five minutes later was dead. Our army who knew and loved him, never could reconcile ourselves to his great loss.

The Battle of Atlanta was one of the few battles of the war where the attack on the Sixteenth Army Corps caught it on the march in the

rear of the army, without intrenchments or protection of any kind, both sides fighting in the open.

In his address describing the battle of the 22nd of July, General Strong, of General McPherson's staff, says: "General McPherson and myself, accompanied only by our orderlies, rode out and took position on the right of Dodge's line, and witnessed the desperate assaults of Hood's army. General McPherson's admiration for the steadiness and bravery of the 16th corps was unbounded. Had the 16th corps given away the rebel army would have been in the rear of the 17th and 15th corps, and would have swept like an avalanche over our supply trains, and the position of the Army of the Tennessee would have been very critical.

General Frank P. Blair pays this tribute to the fighting of the 16th army corps in his official report of the battle of Atlanta. "I started to go back to my command, and witnessed the fearful assault made on the 16th army corps, and its prompt and gallant repulse by that command. It was a most fortunate circumstance for the whole army that the 16th army corps occupied the position I have attempted to describe at moment of attack, and, although it does not belong to me to report upon the bearing and conduct of the officers and men of that corps, still I cannot withold my expression of admiration for the manner in which this command met and repulsed the repeated and persistent attacks of the enemy. The attack upon our flank and rear was made by the whole of Hardee's corps."

Under General Howard, a part of the left wing took part in the battle of the 28th of July. On August 19th I was given a Confederate leave, when that beau-ideal of a soldier, my old-schoolmate and comrade, General T. E. G. Ransom, took command of the corps. The right wing knew him, for he was with you in the Red River campaign. He died on a stretcher in command of the corps in the chase after Hood. The old Second Division had its innings with General Corse at Altoona, where the fighting, has been immortalized in verse and song. My fortunes took me away to the command of the Army and Department of Missouri, and the two divisions of the left wing were merged, one into the 15th and the other into the 17th corps, and, so far as the campaigns were concerned, the corps fought in two units, the right and left wings, and each was a corps command.

The grave of that remarkable soldier, General A. J. Smith, whose distinguished services were so often recognized by Generals Grant and Sherman, has not a stone to designate it. The Society of the Army of the Tennessee is aiding in raising the funds to commemorate his memory and deeds by erecting a monument in his home in St. Louis.

The 16th army corps had great opportunities in the campaigns it

took part in, and never failed to make the most of them. They went cheerfully to any work assigned to them. They have left in the war records a history that they may well be proud of, and every work they have undertaken has received the strong commendation of their superior officers.

ADDRESS TO

ARMY OF SOUTH WEST,

At NATIONAL ENCAMPMENT G. A. R., Washington, D. C., October, 1902.

My connection with the United States forces west of the Mississippi River commenced at the beginning of the war, when I took my regiment, the Fourth Iowa, to St. Louis, and fell under the command of Fremont, and I took part in the campaigns of that Department until after the battle of Pea Ridge, when I left the command and went to the Army of the Tennessee. After the Atlanta campaign, in November, 1864, I returned to Missouri as commander of that Department and Army.

Of the transactions of the troops south of Missouri I have very little knowledge, but I know that the troops which served west of the Mississippi never had credit for the amount of work, hardships and exposures they endured. The fact of there having been fought there but two great battles, Wilson's Creek and Pea Ridge, and two minor ones, what they did was swallowed up in the great events that occured east of the Mississippi. Even Pope's campaign opening up a portion of the Mississippi is hardly ever spoken of.

The battle of Wilson Creek, the first siginal contest west of the Mississippi, was fought before my command reached St. Louis. The history of that battle, and the credit that is due to the commander of that Army, General Lyon, and his men, are well known There participated in the battle many officers who were afterwards greatly distinguished; among them Schofield, Sturgis, Hunter and others. It was the first battle that called attention to the West, and to the troops west of the Mississippi. That battle was lost because a portion of the command did not comprehend and fulfill General Lyon's orders. This mistake would have been overcome if it had not been for the loss in the battle of its commander, General Lyon. But the fighting of the troops and the boldness of the movement immediately attracted the attention of the country, and held it until after the battle of Pea Ridge.

The Army of the Southwest, which General Curtis commanded, and

which travelled five hundred miles from its base without water or rail communication, and lived off a barren country, and which fought that decisive battle of Pea Ridge and cleared the country until nearly the end of the war of any organized force of the enemy, had more marching and endured more suffering than the great armies I was connected with east of the Mississippi, and its three days fighting at Pea Ridge compared favorably with any of our battles, when the numbers engaged are considered.

Then again at the end of the war, the sufferings of the troops that I took onto the plains in the Indian campaigns in the winters of 1864, 1865–6, were far beyond any of the sufferings of any of our armies during the civil war. Their exposures through the cold weather, and the brutalities and butcheries of the Indians, which it was impossible for them to avenge or retaliate, were beyond any description.

Our early campaign in Missouri was without previous experience. It was simply one soldier standing up against another in battle, and we had to learn all the tricks of camp life, and from experience how to take care of our soldiers.

There were a great many funny incidents in the Pea Ridge campaign. The Southwestern army was organized at Rolla, Missouri, of which post I was in command. My quartermaster was Captain Philip H. Sheridan, and my commissary Capt. M. P. Small. No one who knew or saw Sheridan then thought of the great position he was to occupy in our army, but when he took hold of that army and stripped it and fed it, five hundred miles away from rail or water communication, we all knew that he was a master mind. When he came to me at Rolla, the first order he gave was to take away about three-quarters of our transportation. I think we had about two wagons to the company, and he brought us down to about four to a regiment. You can all approciate the rebellion I had on my hands when I undertook to enforce his order. I know he stood by and watched to see what I was going to do. Every regiment and command entered a protest, and said some very unkind things of him, denouncing him as a regular officer who had no mercy upon a volunteer, but I had then had experience enough to appreciate our necessities, and started in by stripping my own regiment, and then enforcing the orders upon the others. We were not long on that march before they appreciated the foresight of Sheridan. He had great energy and great resources. He had to run all the mills along our line of march; he had to forage in every direction, and the punishment that he gave to some of the people to make them tell where their horses, forage and sweet potatoes were hidden would astonish those of our people who have been so horrified at the mild persuasions used for similar purposes in the Philippines.

To show you how little we knew of war on our first march in January, 1862, from Rolla to Springfield, Missouri, all the reports we had obtained were that Price and his army were in Springfield. The troops of our army were divided into two commands, those under Siegel, composed of two divisions, commanded by Osterhaus and Asboth, mostly Germans, and two divisions of Americans commanded by Col. Jeff. C. Davis and Col. E. A. Carr. I commanded a brigade on the extreme left in Carr's division, and, in accordance with instructions, put out a company in front of me as skirmishers. It was dark, and impossible for us to see much, and the first thing I knew I had lost my skirmishers, and was in great distress until about daylight in the morning, when Siegel's guns and our own were booming away at Springfield. My company came back mounted on Confederate horses and mules,—old hacks that the enemy had left behind them—and brought us news that there was no enemy in Springfield, and had not been for two or three days.

As we marched along towards Pea Ridge through the country, Price's army faced us with a rear guard only, his main body keeping a long distance ahead of us. At every stream they would halt our advance, and move out a couple of pieces of their artillery, and put out a strong skirmish line, which would force our army into line, thinking we were going to have a battle. My brigade led the advance most of the time on that march, and as soon as they would line up the officers would have the boys strip. They would throw down their chickens, sweet potatoes and everything they had gathered, and by the time they had gone forward, and the enemy had run, the 36th Illinois, or some other regiment, would come up and gobble what they had left. About the third time we lined up I discovered that every boy was hanging on to his chickens, sweet potatoes and provender, and when I gave orders to the Colonels to have them throw them aside, the boys made auswer: "No you don't, Colonel! You can't fool us any more; we have fed those 36th Illinois fellows as long as we propose to."

At Pea Ridge we were surrounded by Van Dorn, who placed Price's two divisions in our rear, and he himself on our right flank with McCullough and McIntosh's divisions. The great Pea Ridge divided his army, so it was impossible for one part to support the other. His army was twice as large as that of Curtis, and the fact that it was divided enabled Curtis to whip his army in detail, so that Van Dorn's army was virtually whipped before Curtis got his entire force into the field,—Siegel only coming into battle after Van Dorn's Arkansas force had left for the South, Jeff C. Davis' division having killed its two division commanders, and Van Dorn had given Price orders to get out the best way he could, which forced him to retreat to the East towards White River.

After the Pea Ridge campaign the battle of Prarie Grove was fought, under the command of General F. C. Herring, who was Lieut. Colonel of the 9th Iowa Infantry, in the battle of Pea Ridge, but as it was not in my command, I have no knowledge of the detail of it, but from the reports it evidently was a sharp fight.

In the Spring of 1865 Jeff C. Thompson and his command surrendered to me on the Arkansas line. His command consisted of six thousand men, but he found he could not gather them, and claimed that not half of his command was present. When I asked him how it was possible to get them all together, he suggested that I should send them rations. I therefore loaded two steamers from St. Louis, and sent them around by the White River, and Thompson issued his celebrated order bringing the men all in, and there was gathered about twice the number he had present when he surrendered to my forces. When asked for his transportation he said that he would show it to me, and out of the rivers and bayous he run down about one hundred canoes and flats, as the transportation he had to move his army with. It was at this time that he made that celebrated speech. When his soldiers came in without bringing their guns, as he had instructed them to do, bringing along old shot guns and muskets that were of no use, he said if they were not satisfied with the generosity of this Government they should emmigrate to Mexico, and he denounced more than half of them as being soldiers whom he had never seen, stating that they had stayed in the brush and along the river banks in Arkansas until the moss had grown upon their heads and backs. From this speech of his came the celebrated saying of "moss-backs".

A part of my corps fought under that gallant General, A. J. Smith, in the Banks campaign up the Red River, and there is no doubt but that his Generalship and the fighting of the two divisions of the 16th corps saved that army from a great defeat. The commander of one of his divisions, General T. E. G. Ransom, was a school-mate of mine, and afterwards came to me in the Atlanta campaign, and commanded a division under me in the 16th corps.

When I look at the history of all of the operations west of the Mississippi River, and see their results, it is a great gratification to me to know that all the campaigns, except possibly the one of Banks, were victories for our side.

When I returned to the command of the Department of the Missouri in November, 1864, I found all the Indian tribes on the plains at war, occupying all the lines of communication through to the Pacific, and there was a great demand from the people upon the Government that those lines should be opened. General Grant sent a dispatch, asking if a campaign upon the plains could be made in the winter. Having

spent eight or ten years of my life upon the plains before the war, I answered that it could, if the troops were properly fed and clothed. His answer to that was to place all the plains and Indian tribes within my command, instructing me to make an immediate campaign against them, and I had, therefore, to move the troops that were at Leavenworth, Fort Riley and other points onto the plains in mid-winter, and I think it was the 15th Kansas that had thirteen men frozen to death on the march to Fort Kearney. Those troops on that winter march up and down those stage and telegraph lines in forty days opened them up, repaired the telegraph and had the stages running. Then came the longer campaign of the next summer and next fall, where General Cole's command suffered so much, and also where General Conner fought the battle of Tongue River. I remember of the Indians capturing a company of Michigan troops that were guarding a train that was going to Fort Halleck, loaded with rations and bacon. They tied some of the soldiers to the wheels of the wagons, piled the bacon around the wagons, burning them up. A band of this party of Indians was captured by a batallion of Pawnees, who were far north of them and got on their trail and surrounded the band that had committed these atrocities. The chief of them, an old man, came forward and spoke to Major North, who commanded the Pawnees, and holding his hand up to his mouth he said that he was full of white men up to here, and was ready to die. The Indians virtually cleaned out the white people along the stage lines they captured. I took from them a great many of their prisoners in the fall of 1865, when they came into Laramie to make peace, and the stories of the suffering of the women were such that it would be impossible to relate them.

In connection with this campaign on the plains, it is a singular fact that nearly three thousand Confederates took part. When I took command at St. Louis I found the prisons full of Confederate prisoners. The war was then virtually at its end, and they were very anxious to be relieved from prison life, and as we needed forces on the plains, I obtained authority from the War Department to organize what was known as the United States Volunteers, and filled the regiments with these Confederate soldiers, placing over them as officers men and officers selected from our own command, and thus organized a very effective force, which did excellent service on the plains, three quarters of which remained in that country after the war was over.

ADDRESS TO THE

ARMY OF THE TENNESSEE,

DELIVERED AT THE

NATIONAL ENCAMPMENT G. A. R, Washington, D. C.

October, 1902, by Major-General Grenville M. Dodge.

Comrades of Army of the Tennessee:

On the 28th of August, 1861, General U. S. Grant was assigned to duty in command of the District of Southeast Missouri, with headquarters at Cairo, Ill., and here commenced the organization and growth of the Army of the Tennessee. It remained under his personal command, or as a unit of his great army, from the beginning until the end of the war, except for two short intervals, one after the great battle of Donelson, and the other after the greater battle of Shiloh, both of which he won, and gave the first great light and hope to our country, and it is hard now, after reading all the records, to understand the reasons for his being relieved. It appears to have been done through a misunderstanding, and with no intention of doing injustice to General Grant.

Following General Grant as commander came General Sherman, a member of the army almost as long as General Grant. General Sherman was in direct command, or the army served under him as a unit of his greater army, from the time he assumed command until the end of the war.

After General Sherman came General McPherson, that ideal soldier, who commanded the army until he fell in the great battle of Atlanta on the 22nd of July. Upon his death, General Logan took command of the army, as the senior officer present, and at the end of the battle of July 22nd he could say that he had met and defeated Hood's whole army in the greatest battle of that campaign.

Following General Logan came General O. O. Howard, the only General taken from another army to command it in all the history of the Army of the Tennessee, or even any of its corps. The next day

after assuming command General Howard led the army into the great battle of the 28th of July, which the Confederates said was not a battle, but a simple killing and slaughtering of their forces. He remained in command until the end of the rebellion, and at the end of the war generously gave way to General Logan, so that one of its original members might command it at the great review here in Washington, — an act that could come only from such a just and thoughtful soldier as Howard.

I speak of our army's commanders first, as an army takes its habits and character from its head, and probably no other army in the world was so fortunate as to have always at its head great soldiers and great commanders, recognized as such the world over—two of them the peers of any commander that ever stood up in a great conflict.

The army of the Tennessee covered more ground in its campaigns than all the other armies combined, and all its campaigns were marked by some great struggle, battle or movement that challenged the admiration of the world. First came Fort Donelson, next Vicksburg and following that Chattanooga, where it fought on both flanks in that great battle, one division taking the point of Lookout Mountain above the clouds. Then came the Atlanta campaign; following that the stragetical march to the sea, and, finally, that bold movement from Savannah to Goldsboro, which is considered by tne best critics as one of the boldest and best planned campaigns of history, one in which every chance was taken, and every opportunity given the enemy to concentrate upon an inferior force.

The record of this army is probably the most satisfactory of any that ever existed, as it was harmonious in all its parts, and had no jealousies, each of its units to the best of its ability helping the others. Again, it was modest; it struck blow after blow, and let the world sing its praises. All its campaigns were great successes, and it never lost a battle. All its army, corps, division and brigade commanders were exceptionally able men, and were seldom relieved except to assume more important commands. Its experiences were more varied than any other army, for in its campaigns, battles and marches, reaching from the Missouri River to the Atlantic, at Washington, over a territory two thousand miles long and five hundred miles wide, it opened the Mississippi, it forced its way to the sea, it was reviewed by the Government of the nation here in this city, and it disbanded and the men went to their homes without causing an unpleasant comment or a painful thought in all this broad land.

The Society of the Army of the Tennessee is endeavoring to perpetuate its history and memories by erecting here in this capital of our great nation monuments to the memory of its dead commanders,

which will place before the world, not only their deeds, but the great events in which our army took so important a part. First came General McPherson, as he was the first to fall in the great battle of Atlanta. He fell just after watching the attack in the rear on the 16th army corps, which held the key to the situation. He was a dear friend of mine, and the last words he spoke were in praise of the fighting of that corps. General Sherman in reporting his death, spoke of him as follows:

"General McPherson fell in battle, booted and spurred, as the gallant and heroic gentleman should wish. Not his the loss, but the country's, and the army will mourn his death and cherish his memory as that of one who, though comparatively young, had risen by his merit and ability to the command of one of the best armies which the nation had called into existence to vindicate her honor and integrity. History tells of but few who so blended the grace and the gentleness of the friend with the dignity, courage, faith and manliness of the soldier. His public enemies, even the men who directed the fatal shot, never spoke or wrote of him without expressions of marked respect. Those whom he commanded loved him even to idolatry, and I, his associate and commander, fail in words adequate to express my opinion of his great worth."

General McPherson was so dear to our old army that the great victory at the battle of Atlanta was never spoken of by our army except to express our great grief at the loss of our commander. His faith in what he could accomplish with our army was unbounded. He spoke of us on July 4, 1863, as follows:

"With tireless energy, with sleepless vigilance, by night and by day, with battery and with rifle-pits, with trench and mine, you made your sure approaches, until overcome by fatigue and driven to despair in the attempt to oppose your irresistable progress, the whole garrison of over 30,000 men, with all their arms and munitions of war, have, on this, the anniversary of our National Independence, surrendered to the invincible troops of the Army of the Tennessee. The achievments of this hour will give a new meaning to this memorable day, and Vicksburg will brighten the glow of the patriot's heart which kindles at the mention of Bunker Hill and Yorktown. This is indeed an auspicious day for you. The God of battle is with you. The dawn of a conquered peace is breaking upon you. The plaudits of an admiring world will hail you wherever you go, and it will be an enobling heritage, surpassing all riches, to have been of the Army of the Tennessee on the Fourth of July, 1863."

Next we erected the statue facing Pennsylvania Avenue, of General John A. Rawlins, who, above all, represented the organization and

spirit of our great army, and who shared its fortunes from beginning to end as chief of staff of its first and greatest commander. In 1873, upon the death of General Rawlins, General John A. Logan spoke of him thus:

"But there is one whose tongue is now still in death whose name I cannot forbear to mention; one, who, though gone from our midst, is with us in memory—for who can forget John A. Rawlins? Faithful in every duty, true in every trust, though dead he is not forgotten: though gone forever, yet he will ever live in affectionate remembrance in the hearts of all who knew him: his name is woven in indelible colors in the history of our country, and is linked with a fame that is undying."

General Rawlins, in giving a history of the Army of the Tennessee, paid this tribute to it:

"In no army did the soldier enjoy greater liberty, consistent with military discipline, than in the Army of the Tennessee, and in none were his rights and his life more carefully guarded.

The subordination of the Army of the Tennessee to the policies and acts of the Government affecting the institution of slavery in the prosecution of the war, is worthy of the highest commendation. It had no policy of its own to propose, but went forth, as expressed by the Legislative Branch of the Government, to do battle in no spirit of oppression, or for any purpose of conquest or subjugation, or purpose of overthrowing or interfering with the rights or established institutions of the States in rebellion; but to defend and maintain the supremacy of the constitution, and to preserve the Union with all the dignity, equality and rights of the several States unimpaired.

The Army of the Tennessee did great deeds in all the departments of the States' service, and individually and combined illustrated in a peculiar manner the qualities of noble American Character which gained success in the field, preserved its fruits by subsequent statesmanship, and by exalted virtue crowned victory with the attributes of peace and justice."

In April, 1900, we unveiled the beautiful and life-like monument to General John A. Logan, that brilliant, magnetic soldier, our comrade from Cairo to Louisville. Of him, at the unveiling, President McKinley spoke as follows:

"Logan's career was unique. His distinction does not rest upon his military achievments alone. His services in the legislature of his own state, in the national House of Representatives, and in the Senate of the United States would have given him an equally conspicuous place in the annals of the country. He was great in the forum and in the field."

"He came out of the war with the highest military honors of the volunteer soldier. Brilliant in battle and strong in military council, his was also the true American spirit, for when the war was ended he was quick and eager to return to the peaceful pursuits of civil life."

General Logan's love and devotion to us only ended with his life, and at one of our reunions characterized our work thus:

"The Army of the Tennessee was not limited in its scope; the theater of its operations and the extent of its marches, comprehending within their bounds an area greater than Greece and Macedonia in their palmiest days, and greater than most of the leading kingdoms of Europe at the present day, reaching from the Missouri River on the north nearly to the Gulf of Mexico on the South, and from the Red River of Louisiana to the Atlantic Ocean."

Next comes the monument to General William Tecumseh Sherman, the pedestal of which is upon these grounds. The friendship and loyalty of Sherman to Grant was the first great cause of the success of both, and for the harmony that existed in the Army of the Tennessee. Sherman fell under the command of Grant at Paducah in the spring of 1862, holding a small command. He was the ideal soldier, as he dropped from a Department and Army commander to that of a post, and later a division, without a murmur. Sherman's first words to Grant, on Feb. 15, 1862, were these:

"I should like to hear from you, and will do everything in my power to hurry forward to you reinforcements aud supplies, and if I could be of service myself, would gladly come without making any question of rank with you or General Smith, whose commissions are of the same date."

On the same date he wrote again:

"Command me in any way. I feel anxious about you, as I know the great facilities they (the enemy) have of concentration, by means of the river and railroads, but have faith in you."

After the war, at a banquet given him in St. Louis in 1866, at which, as commander of that Department, I was present, General Sherman gave this resumé of his campaigns.

"You cannot attain great success in war without great risks. I admit we violated many of the old established rules of war by cutting loose from our base and exposing sixty thousand lives. I had faith in the army I commanded; that faith was well founded. But there was the old story exemplified. We had the elephant, and again we had to put our wits together and we concluded to kill the elephant. We did not like to do it. I contended at first when we took Vicksburg, that we had gained a point which the Southern Confederacy, as belligerents —so recognized by ourselves and the world—were bound to regard

That when we took Vicksburg by all the rules of civilized warfare they should have surrendered and allowed us to restore Federal power in the land. But they did not. I claim also that when we took Atlanta, they were bound by every rule of civilized warfare to surrender their cause. It was then hopeless, and it was clear to e as daylight that they were bound to surrender and return to civil life. But they continued the war, and then I had a right under the rules of civilized warfare to commence a system that would make them feel the power of the Government, and cause them to succumb to our national authority. So we destroyed Atlanta, and all that could be used against us there will have to be rebuilt. The question then arose in my mind how to apply the power thus entrusted by my Government so as to produce the result—the end of the war, which was all we desired; for war is only justifiable among civilized nations to produce peace. There is no other legitimate rule—except to produce peace. This is the object of war, and it is so universally aknowledged. Therefore, I had to go through Georgia, and let them see what war meant. I had the right to destroy their communications, which I did. I made them feel the consequences of war, so they will never again invite an invading army. Savannah fell, as a matter of course. Once in our power, the question then arose again, 'what next?' All asked 'what next?' I asked advice again and again, but I got mighty little, I can tell you except from Grant, who is always generous and fair. No advice—no word at Savannah, save from Mr. Lincoln, who asked 'what next? I told him I would tell him after a little while.

Then came the last movement, which I do contend involved more labor and risk than anything which I have done, or ever expect to do again. I could take Charleston without going there. First, by segregating it from the rest of the country so it could not live. Man must have something to live upon. He must go where there is something to eat, therefore I concluded to break up the railroads, so the people had to get out of Charleston or perish. Then the next thing was to place the army in Columbia, which I tell you is more of a place in the South than you are aware of. Years ago I thought Columbia would be the scene of the great and final struggle of the war. I thought our Western army would go Eastward and our Eastern army Southward to Columbia, and that we would fight it out there. The people there regard it as a place of security. They sent their treasure there and their wines and liquors, which my friend Blair remembers so well. But if you place an army where the enemy say you cannot, you gain an object. All military readers will understand the principle; and, therefore, when I placed my army in Columbia, I fought a battle, I reaped the fruits of a victory—bloodless, but still it produced military

results. The next question was to place my army still further where I could be in communication with the old Army of the Potomac—where we could destroy the life of the Confederate armies, for it seemed at one time as though they were determined to fight to the 'last ditch.'

So we went to Goldsboro, and then I hastened to see Mr. Lincoln and Grant for the last time. We talked the matter over and agreed perfectly. Grant was moving then. I had been fifty odd marching days on light rations. My men were shoeless and without pants, and needed clothing and rest. I hurried back to Goldsboro, and dispatched everything with as great rapidity as I could, and on the very day I appointed I started in pursuit of Johnston, let him be where he might. Now understand, that in this vast campaign we had no objective point on the map; all we had to do was to pursue the Confederate armies wherever they might go and destroy them whenever we could catch them. The great difficulty was to bring them to bay. You can chase and chase a hare until the end of time, but unless you bring him to bay you cannot catch him. Grant was enabled to bring Lee to bay by means of Sheridan's cavalry. I did not have sufficient cavalry; if I had I might have brought Johnston to bay; but with my then force I could not, because my cavalry was inferior to his in numbers. Therefore, when Lee surrendered, Johnston saw as clearly as I had seen months before, that his cause was gone. I had been thinking of it for months; therefore, when he met me and announced the fact that he was 'gone up' I was prepared to receive it. It was just like a familiar song. It seemed to the North a new thing. We had expected it, and when they gave up there was an end of it, as we supposed. How did they give up, was the question; gave up—that was all. No use in fighting any longer. On what terms did they give up? I have described sufficiently clear in my official report all the conversation that took place, and all I will say is that the North seemed to be taken unawares, although every paper in the land and every county court orator had preached about peace for the last four years; yet when it came they did not recognize it. All I claim is that I was prepared for it from the start. The moment Johnston spoke to me I saw peace at once, and I was honest enough to say so. But all that is now past and I am satisfied in my heart that we have peace."

The monument to our old commander is nearly complete. We expect to unveil it next October, and, as President of the Society of the Army of the Tennessee, and as President of the Commission which has in charge the erection of the monument, I give you a cordial invitation to be present. You will receive due notice, and proper arrangements will be made for the occasion, and you will meet here your comrades of the Armies of the Cumberland, Potomac and Ohio, who

have already signified their intention of being present to honor the memory of our old commander.

And now, my comrades, it is with the greatest satisfaction that I say to you that after seven years continued effort, this year we obtained an appropriation from Congress of $250,000 to be used in the erection of a monument upon these grounds to General U. S. Grant, and the model for it will soon be selected, to this modest, charitable and just soldier and statesman. The whole world has given its tribute. From those whom we fought and defeated have come the most gallant words of praise, and touching in sympathy. President Lincoln, above all others, recognized his power and ability when he handed him his commission and gave him command of all the armies, and assured him that he should not in any way interfere with him. Armed him with all the powers of the President, with carte blanche to use them as he saw fit. Grant made his answer at Appomattox, bringing peace to our nation and gratitude to the conquered. General Grant was a man of few words, and when called upon to speak of the Army of the Tennessee, paid it this tribute:

"As an army, the Army of the Tennessee never sustained a single defeat during four years of war. Every fortification which it assailed surrendered. Every force arrayed against it was either defeated, captured or destroyed. No officer was ever assigned to the command of that army who had aftewards to be relieved from it, or to be reduced to another command. Such a history is not accident."

And now, my comrades, one of our number who has left us by an assassin's hand, whose heart, words and acts were ever for us, who from a major in our army became the best-loved President of our nation, Comrade William McKinley, at one of our gatherings paid this tribute to you:

"It is recorded that in eighteen months' service the Army of the Tennessee captured eighty thousand men with flags and arms, including six hundred guns. A greater force than was engaged on either side in the terrible battle of Chicamauga. From the fields of triumph in the Mississippi Valley it turned its footsteps towards the eastern seaboard, brought relief to the forces at Chattanooga and Nashville, pursued that peerless campaign from Atlanta to the seaboard under the leadership of the glorious Sherman, and planted the banners of final victory on the parapets of Fort McAllister.

It is said that the old Army of the Tennessee never lost a battle and never surrendered a flag. Its corps badges—'forty rounds' of the Fifteenth Corps; the fleeting arrow of the Seventeenth Corps; the disc, from which four bullets have been cut, of the Sixteenth Corps—

are all significant of the awful business of cruel war, all of them suggestive of the missiles of death.

It gave the Federal army Grant, Sherman and Sheridan; McPherson, Howard, Blair, Logan, Hazen, John E. Smith, C. F. Smith, Halleck. Rawlins, Prentiss, Wallace, Porter, Force, Leggett, Noyes Hickenlooper, C. C. Walcutt and your distinguished President, who flamed out the very incarnation of soldierly valor before the eyes of the American people; all have a secure place in history and a secure one in the hearts of their countrymen."

On this anniversary, as my closing words to you, two verses of General John Tilson's tribute are most appropriate:

"Ho! comrades of the brave old band, we gather here once more,
With smiling eye and clasping hand, to fight our battles o'er.
To qualf from out the brimming cup of old-time memory,
And bright relight the pathway of our old Tennessee.
As myriad sparks of war's romance our meetings warm inspire;
The heady fight, the anxious march, the jolly bivouac fire;
The days of doubt, of hope, of care, of danger and of glee;
Oh, what a world of racy thought illumines Tennessee.

Our roster thins, as years pass on we drop off one by one;
Ere long, too soon, to yearly call, there will be answer—none;
Then as along the record page these mourning columns creep,
The whisper comes to closer still our living friendships keep.
Another thought we forward cast to that not distant day,
When left of all our gallant band will be one veteran gray,
And here's to him who meets alone—wherever he may be,
The last, the lone survivor of the grand old Tennessee."

REMARKS AT

LOYAL LEGION, NEW YORK COMMANDERY,

ON DEATH OF

PRESIDENT McKINLEY.

It is impossible for me to conceive of a brain so brutal that it would raise an assassin's hand to kill so kindly a man as President McKinley, who spent his entire life in working for the benefit of mankind. It seems strange that in our free country, our rulers are not as safe as the greatest despots in the world. It is difficult for me to accept the fact that I shall never meet again President McKinley, who has been so long a close and dear friend. I have known him for twenty years, and intimately since 1892. In that year the McKinley Tariff Bill, which brought McKinley such great prominence in this nation and the world, became a law. At that time I was in Europe on business, and had travelled through Sweden, Norway, Germany and France, and the protests against the bill in all those countries was something beyond the conception of any of our people, in fact, they were so bitter against America and Americans that they were hardly treated with common decency. Knowing the feeling in those countries, even before the bill had an opportunity to be tested, also the fact that most of the Americans residing in Europe expressed the same feeling in relation to it. I wrote to Representative McKinley stating the facts as I found them there. I wrote him two or three letters, and in the last one expressed to him the opinion that notwithstanding the bitter feeling existing against the law and himself, I believed in the near future both it and he would be as popular as they were now unpopular. Upon receipt of my letters McKinley wrote me, stating that he was very much interested in them, and asking me, if I remained abroad, to continue them, and when I returned he would be pleased to see me and talk with me about them. It was a year after my return before I saw him, and the sentiment in this country had already begun to change. When he met me his first words were in relation to the prophesy in my letters.

In the fall of 1894 the Society of the Army of the Tennessee held its reunion at Council Bluffs on the Missouri River. At that time McKinley was making a speaking trip with a special train of cars through Nebraska and the Western country. He came to the Bluffs just as our reunion had closed. He had intended to reach there to take part in the reunion. He insisted that we should join him on his way East, and my car was attached to his train. Several of the distinguished veterans of that old army were with me, also the sons of our two great commanders, Grant and Sherman. As we travelled past at every siding and station great crowds collected to hear McKinley. He would go to the end of the car and make his acknowledgments, and state that he had with him a portion of the Society of the Army of the Tennessee, also the sons of the two great generals of the war, Grant and Sherman, and that he knew they preferred to hear them rather than himself, and then he would introduce them to the crowd, and they, of course, were received with great enthusiasm, and each in his own way made short speeches of acknowledgment, and acquitted themselves very creditably, often receiving the commendation of McKinley. This showed McKinley's tact in utilizing these two young men, and bringing them to the front in place of himself. With him on this trip was his devoted wife, and no one could see the tender attentions that he paid her without realizing that the great love this nation had for him on account of the tender relation that existed between them was fully deserved.

At the beginning of the Spanish War I was called to Washington, and with some other veterans of the civil war, listened to the discussions upon the different problems and schemes that were presented for the conducting of that war. There were presented to the President many different problems and plans and service—chimerical schemes, but we soon discovered that discussions were proper ones and he took the course which indicated that he was competent to handle the situation. He concentrated on the Southern coast the little regular army, ready for any emergency, while the volunteer force was being organized and concentrated in camps which some thought could be put in the field in thirty days, but which the old army officers and officers of the regular army knew would require at least six months to prepare properly for efficiency in a campaign. Later during the war it became my duty to see and read all the records of the Spanish War, every letter, every order and every telegram, and I was most favorably impressed with the excellent judgment and tact, and the prompt decision of our President. Even in cases of emergency where he had not to act upon the moment without consultates, his decisions were prompt and definite, and I know of no single case in which they were

not right. He impressed us all with the fact that he was not only a great statesman, but a great soldier. The wonderful handling by the administration of Cuba, the Philippines and China has builded a reputation for this country, and a monument to its statesmanship, its generalship and its fighting qualities that no one now even attempts to pull down, and one that no matter how severely it may have been criticised, is the wonder of the world.

My last meeting with President McKinley was in April last, at the unveiling of the monument to Major-General John A. Logan. He was then preparing for his proposed trip to California, and I suggested to him that it was a pretty long and tedious trip, and asked him if he was making it for pleasure, or as a duty. His answer to me was that he was looking forward to it with a great deal of pleasure, but he said, "you know General I necessarily will be under a good deal of strain, for I will have to speak at every point we stop, and I have to be careful and study and consider what I say." He also said that he desired to see the Pacific Coast country, as it was developing so fast, and there were so many questions arising, and such demands from the people there for legislation, that he would like to see personally what they needed so he could act upon questions understandingly. On the day of the unveiling of the statue, in riding up from the White House with him in the procession, his four years of administration came up, and in discussing it he said to me: "the greatest benefit of my "administration to our country and the greatest pleasure to me is "that the two sections of our country have come together as one "people in interest, and there is no longer any sectional line;—in "fact sectionalism had been abolished. If there is any of that "sentiment existing, the opportunity given during the Spanish, "Philippine and Spanish Wars to all sections to join in upholding the "flag, dissipated it, and none were more prompt or more satisfactory "than the responses from the South." The policy laid down by President McKinley at Buffalo showed a wonderful grasp of the situation and of the necessities of this nation, and of its future needs. General Grant, when he was entering upon a battle or a campaign, used to call around him his principal officers for the purpose of explaining to them the plans of the battle, and what he expected each to do. He did not consult them as to their opinions, but simply gave in detail what he had determined to accomplish, and they discussed their part in it, and when he felt that they had thoroughly mastered it, he used to say to them "Gentlemen, I see you grasp the situation, and that wins the battle." McKinley in his administration has shown that he also grasped the situation, and of necessity won the battle. The policy pursued by him in his four years administration, the policy

outlined for the future, has not only won the support of this nation, but it has made us a world power.

On such an occasion as this I always think of an incident that occurred during the first prominent battle in which I was engaged. After fighting for two days, on the second night details were sent out to bury the dead. The detail from my command had dug the trenches and laid the boys in them, and covered them with their overcoats, and thought that the commanding officer should be present when the final good-by to their comrades was said. They sent a young soldier to me requesting me to join them in the funeral work. It was a dark night, and carrying a lantern, the young boy took me through the woods to the place where the comrades were being laid away, and as the earth was shovelled in upon them this young boy said to me: "Colonel! my captain lies there, and no better captain ever lived." So we can say of President McKinley, our captain lies in Canton, and no better President ever lived.

NORWICH UNIVERSITY BANQUET

New York 1902.

I take great pleasure in welcoming you to the banquet of the New York Association of Norwich University. The distinguishing feature of this university is that nine-tenths of its students are dependent upon their own efforts, not only for their education, but their future in the world, and there is no doubt that from this fact so many of its cadets have been successful in all the walks of life. It is a military college. Its first President was the first Commandant of West Point, and from its organization until today it has stood first in the records of the War Department as compared with other institutions of a similar character, and second only to West Point.

In the Mexican War its President, Truman R. Ransom, and most of the cadets entered the service of the United States. Ransom was Colonel of the New England Regiment, and fell in the assault upon Chapultapec.

In the civil war ninety per cent. of its living cadets entered the service, mostly as officers, on one side or the other, and, as the history of the university shows, many of them rose to the highest rank and highest commands in the service. The university received the commendations of Generals Grant, Sherman, Sheridan, Thomas and others, and Norwich University cadets were always selected next to those from West Point, for important and difficult demands. There are present here tonight those who were cadets during the civil war whose whole class enlisted. In fact the whole university turned out, suspending the functions of the institution for two years.

In the Spanish War it is said that eighty-five per cent. of its living cadets volunteered for service, and were distinguished on many fields. Many of them are still in the service. It was equally as well represented in our navy in both wars. It was one of its cadets that struck the first effective blow in the Spanish War, and another cadet, Commander Colvocorresses, who commanded one of the vessels, after the naval battle at Manila went alongside the Olympia to pay his respects and congratulate Admiral Dewey upon his great victory. Admiral

Dewey, who saw Colvocorresses as he came alongside in his launch, leaned over the rail and said, "Col. old N U. is ahead yet," showing no matter what his after life or education had been, he gave the credit for his success to his *alma mater*.

In civil life its cadets have greatly distinguished themselves as engineers, and in other professional lines. Probably I can say that there is no one who has had as many of the cadets of Norwich University under him as I have, both in the civil war, and later in the internal improvements of the country, and to my knowledge there has been no failure among them. They have universally taken their places and held them until they went to higher positions. The university to-day is the military college of the State of Vermont, which assigns to it a representative cadet for each senatorial district.

I believe myself there is no education so beneficial to a young man as that which gives discipline, respect for power and obedience to orders, and the drill and exercise add to the health of the student, so when he steps out into the world to fight his way he is better equipped than those who have gone through college without this physical and mental training.

I am happy to say that the university has never been so prosperous as it is to-day. The interest in it is growing, and it is a great satisfaction to the old cadets to see and feel the high esteem in which it is held throughout the country. In comparison with other colleges few in numbers, but in acts and all things that go to make and defend a great country we stand the peer of the best institutions of learning our country has produced.

REMARKS AT

ARMY OF POTOMAC REUNION,

Niagara Falls, N. Y.

When you consider that it is now thirty-three years after the war, that the Government has published every report, letter and order that was of any moment, you will agree with me that it is difficult to interest an army audience in talking about another army, and I shall not detain you long on that subject There are, however, some incidents of General Grant's first visit to your army, his return to ours and the planning of the grand campaign that was to end the war that may interest you

When General Grant was called East to receive his commission and assume command of all the armies, the Army of the Tennessee was camped along the railway from Columbia, Tennessee to Decatur and Huntsville, Alabama General Sherman had taken our Commander, General McPherson, and had left Logan and my corps to shift for themselves, while he made a short campaign with the 17th corps from Vicksburg to Meridian, destroying all railway communications in Mississippi preparatory to our 1864 campaign. General Grant returned from Washington in December to Tennessee He met General Sherman in Nashville and called there to meet him several Corps Commanders of the Army of the Tennessee and General Sheridan of the Army of the Cumberland. If I remember rightly, there were present Generals Grant, Sherman, Sheridan, McPherson, Logan, Rawlins and myself. All of us of the Army of the Tennessee were a hard looking crowd. None of us had seen Nashville or any base of supplies since we had marched from the Mississippi River to Chattanooga and had been hard at work building railways and foraging. We arrived in Nashville late in the afternoon and General Sherman took us to General Grant's headquarters. General Grant suggested that we should call upon the Military Governor of Tennessee, Andrew Johnson, and pay our respects to him. We, of course, followed General Grant and were introduced to Governor Johnson. I remember that our uniforms were greatly worn, one or two of us wearing blouses with army overcoats, and he looked at us with a very quizzical eye, until General Grant said to excuse us that he had not given us time since we reached the city to change our suits, but Grant knew

we had no others. Governor Johnson was then a very radical man and was very emphatic in informing us that while he was Military Governor of Tennessee no rebel would receive much consideration from him, and brought his fist down on a piano in the room with such force that the sound from it startled us all, and we left there with the idea that rebels in Tennessee had better get out, but we soon found that his words were much stronger than his acts, for I hardly ever got my hands on rebel stock or supplies that I did not find Johnson trying to pull them off

After our visit, General Sherman suggested that we should all go to the theater that evening, and under his lead we went to the principal opera house to hear the plav of Hamlet. We were all strangers in Washington, even General Grant was not well known. We paid our way in and found the theatre crowded with soldiers going to and returning from veteran furloughs. General Sherman, who you all know was a great lover of the theatre, sat along side of me and soon commenced criticising the play, earnestly protesting that it was being murdered. I had to check him several times and tell him unless he kept quiet the soldiers in the audience would recognize him and there would be a scene. We had entered late, and there soon came on the scene where Hamlet soliliquizes over the skull of Yorrick. The audience was perfectly still endeavoring to comprehend the actor's words, when a soldier far back in the audience rose up and in a clear voice called out, as the actor held up the skull, "Say pard, What is it, Yank or Reb?" The house appreciated the point and was instantly in an uproar, and General Grant said we had better leave, so we went quietly out, no one discovering Grant's or Sherman's presence. Sherman immediately suggested that we should find an oyster-house and get something to eat, and General Rawlins was put forward as guide and spokesman. He found a very inviting place. We went in and found there was but one large table in the place. There was one man sitting at it and Rawlins in his modest way, without informing the man who his party was, asked him if he would change to a smaller table and let us have that one. The man said the table was good enough for him and kept on eating, and Rawlins backed out into the street again. Sherman said if we depended on Rawlins we would get nothing to eat and said he would see what could be done. He hailed a man who pointed out another saloon kept by a woman and to this Sherman took us and she served us what we then considered a very nice oyster stew. As we sat around the table, we talked more than we ate, and by the time we had half finished our supper the woman came in and asked for the pay and said we must leave, as under the military rules her house must close at 12 midnight and it was then a few

minutes after that hour, so out we got and took our way to Grant's headquarters, where we bunked down the best we could during the night. Some of the staff heard of our evening's adventure and gave the news to the press and the next morning before breakfast all the parties were present to apologize to Grant that they did not recognize him, as we were out of our own jurisdiction and in that of the Army of the Cumberland, but Grant in his modest way satisfied them that he had no complaint. However, there poured in on him for all of us complimentary tickets and invitations to almost everything in Nashville.

After breakfast we all assembled in a large room at headquarters to hear what General Grant had to say to us. We were all anxious to hear of his visit to the Army of the Potomac, and his opinion of it, and Sherman soon got him to talking about it. He said it was the finest army he had ever seen, far superior to any of ours in equipment, supplies and transportation. He said however, that the officers he talked with considered he would have a much more difficult problem on his hands than he had had in the West and he said to Sherman that some officer who both of them knew, but whose name I have forgotten, told him, "You have not faced Bobby Lee yet," and as he said it, I could see that twinkle in Grant's eye that we often saw there when he meant mischief. Grant, after discussing the Army of the Potomac and having nothing but praise for it, informed us that he should make his headquarters with that army and leave Sherman to command the armies of the West, also informing us that he proposed to take several of us East with him. Sherman protested strongly against this and it was finally compromised by his taking Sheridan and leaving the rest of us with Sherman. During the two or three days we were with Grant, he outlined in a general way his plan of campaign that every army should move as early as possible in the Spring, all on the same day against the enemy, so that Lee and Johnston could not detach any of their commands to reinforce the others. He said, "I will try to keep Lee from sending any force to Johnston," but he said to Sherman, "If he does, I will send you two men where he sends one." He also informed us of the necessity of closing the war with this campaign.

Our visit with Grant ended, he took Sherman as far as Cincinnati with him, to talk over and complete their plans, while we returned to our commands to fit them out for the campaign. General Sherman has since pointed out to me in the Burnett House at Cincinnati the room they occupied the night before they parted, and where over their maps, the final orders were given him and final arrangements made that inaugurated the two great campaigns of Richmond and

Petersburg in the East and Atlanta in the West. After the Atlanta campaign I paid General Grant a visit at City Point. I reached his headquarters in October and spent two weeks with him, and saw the armies of the James and Potomac. Evenings we would sit around his camp-fire, and in his genial, comprehensive way, he told us of his campaign and the great battles you had fought and brought out fully to me what a great army you were. I asked him what he claimed for the Battle of the Wilderness. There had been great discussion, as you know, about it, and Grant with the same twinkle of the eye that I had seen at Nashville said "I only claim that after that battle, and I took the initiative on the march towards Richmond, that the Army of the Potomac was no longer afraid of Bobby Lee." He had not forgotten his talk with us at Nashville.

Now you have had Grant's opinion of your great army, and as my toast is the Army of the Tennessee, I will close by giving you General Grant's description of that army when called upon to respond to the same toast at one of our reunions. He said, "As an army, the Army of the Tennessee never sustained a single defeat during four years of war. Every fortification which it assailed surrendered. Every force arrayed against it was either defeated, captured or destroyed. No officer was ever assigned to the command of that army who had afterwards to be relieved from it or to be reduced to another command. Such a history is not accident."

GEN. G. M. DODGE ON "WATER CURE."

The New York Evening Post has thus been "called down" by Gen. Grenville M. Dodge, who is well known throughout Iowa and the Nation as one of the leading corps commanders of the Union army during the Civil war:

To the Editor of the Evening Post.—As one who has had some experience in the necessities, usages and cruelties of war, which always prevail during a campaign in an enemy's country, I am surprised at the position of your journal, and its bitterness against the alleged action of Major Glenn, Lieut. Conger and Assistant Surgeon Lyon.

The testimony of Sergeant Riley, upon which you base your attack on these officers, goes to prove that they gave the water cure to a Filipino, who had been made presidente in one of the provinces by our government, who had taken the oath of allegiance to our country, and then used his official position to cover his acts as captain of an insurgent company which was acting in arms against our army and within our lines. Therefore, he was a traitor and a spy, and his every act was a violation of the laws of war, and branded him an outlaw and guerrilla. If these are the facts, under the usages of war these officers were justified in what they did; in fact, if they had shot the traitor, they would never have been called to account, and in all probability this is what would have happened to him in the Civil war.

An officer has great latitude under such circumstances, and it is not safe or fair to condemn one for almost any act that detects a traitor and spy in arms against the government which he has sworn to protect, and which has put him in a position of trust. You ignore entirely this side of the question, and only treat Major Glenn's acts as cruelties to peaceable Filipino citizens. I can remember when the journals of this country upheld and applauded an officer who, in the Civil war, ordered a man shot if he attempted to haul down the American flag, and cannot understand the present hysterics of some journals over the terrible violation of the laws of war in punishing a traitor, caught in the act, with the water cure only. The treatment may have been severe, but it is not permanently harmful.

I am astonished that these fearfully wrought-up journals have no word of commendation for our soldiers in the Philippines, who have suffered untold cruelties, assassinations, burning by slow fires, burial alive, mutilations and atrocities, who have submitted to every indignity without resentment or complaint, and I have been greatly gratified over their excellent behavior under such trying circumstances. In their comments, these journals are very careful not to say why these punishments are given to such traitors, knowing well if they did our people would look upon the acts as one of the necessities of war, and would wonder at the leniency of Major Glenn and his command.

GRENVILLE M. DODGE.

NEW YORK, April 17.

There can be no doubt that "war is hell," no matter whether it be on the Philippine Islands or any other place on the world. There has been much howling over the administration of "the water cure" in the Philippines, but every man who has had one year's experience in real war will admit that that "cure" is not so severe as killing or wounding captured enemies who have knowledge of hidden arms or other army supplies. Every one of the "water cured" Filipinos was given the opportunity to escape that punishment, but refused to tell what he knew and was therefore rightly punished until he was willing to tell the truth. Gen. Dodge's letter proves that the punishment was justified, and his opinion will be sustained by every person who has knowledge of "the necessities, usages and cruelties of war, which "always prevail during a campaign in an enemy's country." The truth is that the armies of the United States have been too lenient in the Philippines. That is the reason why the war has been so long continued, and the only reason why the final peace will be still further delayed. War is never a picnic, but should at all times be made terrible in order that peace and safety may be speedily gained. "The water cure" is inclined to be slightly irritating to the throats of the traitors in the Philippines, it is true, but it is not so bad or so cruel as wounding them for life, or killing them. The yellow journals may continue to howl, but the loyal American people will sustain the soldiers of the Nation in every effort to compel peace that comes within the rules of war.

ADDRESS TO

NEW YORK COMMANDERY,

Military Order of Loyal Legion.

ON CRUELTIES IN THE PHILIPPINES.

I desire to enter my protest and call the attention of the companions to the position of a portion of the public press, and some people, towards our army in the Philippines, and what they assert are cruelties perpetrated there.

There is a certain portion of the press, and also of the people, who are and always have been absolutely opposed to the operations of our army in the Philippines. They were very anxious to push us into a war which we were all opposed to, but after getting us there they refused to accept the results, and have persistently opposed everything done that was not in exact accordance with their views. In order to work upon the sympathies of the people, some of the papers are publishing pictures showing our soldiers in the very act of committing great outrages; the pictures were manufactured in their own offices, as were also most of the outrages complained of. You have not, however, seen in these papers any pictures portraying the cruelties perpetrated upon our soldiers, which have been worse than any acts ever committed by the savages in our wars with them; they are in fact, too revolting to relate. I have had much to do with Indian warfare, but have never seen any cruelties to be compared with those inflicted upon our soldiers by the Filipinos, and these occurrences were not rare, but general,—happening all the time. Very little has been said on this subject, for it was not the policy of the Government to have the stories of these atrocities printed, or brought before the people, but now that our army is being so bitterly attacked, it is time that the soldiers' side of the question should be presented, and we are learning of the soldiers who have been assassinated, their feet burned, buried alive, killed by slow burning fires, their bowels cut open and wound around trees. The Filipinos indulged in every torture and indignity that was possible, and, as a general thing, our soldiers did not retaliate. How they managed to refrain from taking vengeance is beyond my comprehension, but their action is greatly to their credit and honor.

The question I wish to bring before you, however, is what are the rights of an officer in such matters; what are his duties and privileges in war in an enemy's country that is under martial law? Take for instance, General Smith's position when he was sent to Samar, with instructions to wipe out the insurrection there. He is said to have issued instructions to kill everybody found in arms that was over ten years of age, and to burn the country, if it was necessary to wipe out the insurrection, and the result is that in ninety days, or less, he did wipe out the insurrection, and without any great loss on our side or on the part of the enemy. Now they are denouncing him for a threat,—not an act. The temptation to retaliate must have been very great, for the treatment the 9th Infantry received from those savages was nothing short of murder, followed with the most horrible mutilation, by a people who pretended to be their friends and at peace. In the ninety days he was operating there General Smith brought the island to peace, everybody in it has surrendered, and it is quiet. If he had made war under the methods advocated, allowing no one to be hurt, in all probability the subjugation of the island would have required a year's time, and there would have been ten times the suffering and loss of life that actually occurred. He simply followed the plan of war that was pursued by Grant, Sherman and other commanders in the Civil War, that is, made it just as effective and short as possible. You know Sherman's position was that after a certain length of time when an enemy had been whipped, it was their duty to cease making war, and if they did not do so, he considered that any means were justifiable in order to bring it to an end. He stated this very clearly in his St. Louis speech. He stated the case as follows: "I claim that when we took Vicksburg by all the rules of civilized warfare the Confederates should have surrendered, and allowed us to restore peace in the land. I claim also that when we took Atlanta they were bound by every rule of civilized warfare to surrender their cause, which was then hopeless, and it was clear as daylight that they were bound to surrender and return to civil life, but they continued the war, and then we had a right under the rules of civilized warfare to commence a system that would make them feel the power of the Government, and make them succumb. I had to go through Georgia to let them see what war meant. I had a right to destroy, which I did, and I made them feel the consequences of war so fully they will never again invite an invading army."

You all know of the troubles that occurred in the border states during the Civil War, and of the cruelties to the families of union men who entered our army. It was father against son, brother against brother, and, as General Sherman said, "it was cruelty, and there was no re-

fining it." We know what severe orders were given for treatment of enemies within our lines, when their acts were in violation of the laws of war. In one case torpedoes were placed under a road over which our troops were marching, and several soldiers were killed. Sherman happened to come along just at that time, and said to the Colonel of the 1st Alabama Cavalry, which was his escort: "Burn the country within fifteen miles surrounding this spot." You all know what that meant; it was a license under which other things besides burning was done. An eye witness describes Sherman's march to the sea and through the Carolinas as a "cloud of smoke by day and a pillar of fire by night." Who ever made the suggestion that Sherman's uniform should be stripped off for this, or that he should be shot, as some of our representatives in Congress and our press now demand should be done for making war in earnest.

Take another case, where Captain Anderson captured a train of convalescent unarmed union soldiers in North Missouri, and placed them in line and shot every one of them. Shortly afterwards Colonel Johnson, of the Missouri State Militia, who was following Anderson, came up. Anderson attacked this militia command of 160 men and killed 143, only 17 getting away. Only one man was taken alive, and he saved himself by giving a masonic sign. The war records are full of cases of individual acts, and I select one of which I had personal knowledge. It is found in volume 38 of the war records. The orders in Missouri at that time were that any person who harbored a guerilla, and did not report the fact to the nearest commanding union officer, should receive the same treatment as the guerilla. A man by the name of McReynolds violated these orders, and harbored Quantrell, the guerilla, and the officer who detected it after stating all the facts and evidence, reported to me as follows: "On consultation with the squadron commanders, Captain Hamblin and Lieut. Grain, it was decided to execute McReynolds, which was carried out under my orders. R. M. Box, Capt. Co. H., 7th Cavalry, Missouri State Militia." In reporting this case to the Adjutant General in Washington I did not approve it, as my investigation showed that the statements of McReynolds' acts were true. I did not censure the officers, but issued an order that officers should follow more closely the orders of the Department, and ended that order as follows: "Hereafter men caught in arms will have no mercy shown them" General John McNeill of Missouri took 12 citizens out and shot them, it being claimed they were connected with guerillas that shot a union man. In some History it is known as the Palmyra massacre. It is claimed that the union men turned up alive. If the reports of the numbers of robbers, guerillas and outlaws who were shot on sight in Kentucky, Missouri,

Tennessee and elsewhere by both sides in 1864 and 1865 could be gathered up they would furnish retaliations and cruelties enough for these water cure journals for years.

Consider this matter in a broader sense. Take the order of General Grant to General Sheriden to make the Shenandoah Valley a barren waste; it was absolutely destroyed so the enemy could not again occupy it. I can see no difference between a barren waste than Smith's order to make Samar a "howling wilderness." Take the order I received to go to the rear of Bragg's army and destroy the valley of the Tennessee, and all the supplies gathered there for the use of his army, which valley was burned from Bear River to Decatur. These were orders from principal officers in our army, and I only quote them to show the contrast between that time and the present. Senators in the places in Congress find it necessary in these days to take up the question. Senator Rawlins of Utah made an attack upon our officers, and especially upon General Chaffee, which was nothing short of disgraceful, and should not be allowed to go without vigorous condemnation. He represents a state and people under whose orders Lieutenant Gunnison and his party were massacred by Mormons disguised as Indians. Someone should get up in the Senate and call him to account for these things, and ask him in consideration of these facts, why he is so deeply outraged by the orders of General Chaffee, a gallant soldier and gentleman, a humane man, and one, who in my opinion, has done nothing in the Philippines but what was perfectly justified, and will in time be considered to have been humane.

The two Senators from Colorado have taken it upon themselves to denounce in bitter terms what they call unheard of acts and cruelties of our army. I would point them to a case in their own state, which was more severe than any act in the Philippines has been. A regiment of Colorado cavalry under Col. J. M. Chivington, a minister by profession, attacked and destroyed a band of Indians encamped on the Big Sandy, near Camp Lyon, who claimed to be under the protection of the officers at Fort Lyon. This was a massacre of men, women and children of a friendly band of Indians, and was one of the main causes of bringing into arms against the United States every tribe of Indians south of the Yellowstone. When an investigiton of this affair was ordered the State of Colorado almost unanimously protested against it, upholding the act, and quoted that old saying: "There is no good Indian except a dead one." Think of our wars with the Indians in which whole bands were wiped out, even the women and children being destroyed; think of the wars in which we employed Indians against Indians; they not only killed but scalped; I do not know of a single treaty ever made with the Indians that the United States has

not violated, and when an Indian had the hardihood to object the Government started in to wipe him out. This has been the treatment of the Indians from the Atlantic to the Pacific, until at the present time there is not a wild Indian living in the entire country, yet I cannot remember that this press has ever been aroused; it was too near home.

Take the case of Major Glenn, who is about to be courtmartialed for giving the water cure to the Presidente in one of the Provinces in Luzon, as the testimony goes to show. This Presidente had been appointed to office by our government, had taken the oath of allegiance, and was there to represent us. While he was occupying this position, it was discovered that he was the captain of an insurgent company, giving active assistance to the enemy, and he was, therefore a traitor and a spy and under the laws of war deserved to be shot, but instead they proposed to courtmartial Glenn for simply giving him the water cure, and this, in my opinion, is a great wrong.

Order 100, which is often quoted, was issued in the Civil War to govern officers. It was prepared by Professor Lieber, and was considered and adopted, I believe, by a board of officers; anyhow, it was very carefully drawn. I am told it has been considered and used by nearly all the nations. It gives an officer great latitude, and where an officer meets a savage enemy or one that is violating the laws of war, those laws are suspended and it virtually is left to his own judgment as to how far he should go in inflicting punishment, and under this order there is no doubt both Smith and Glenn were protected in their actions. It may seem harsh, but you are all aware how many harsh orders were given in the Civil War for the purpose of forcing the enemy to comply, and how often those orders and threats accomplished the purpose without any other act. When the colored troops were first organized on several occasions Confederate officers sent in demands for them to surrender, coupled with the threat that if they refused the place would be taken and no quarter granted. I know of one instance where an officer believed this threat and surrendered a regiment of colored infantry for the purpose of having them protected. Then there is the case of Fort Pillow; whether or not Forest gave the order it is claimed he gave, I do not know, but the fact that no quarter was shown there has been amply verified.

With the past week there has been appointed a committee of distinguished citizens, most of whom are well-known opponents of our Government in its policies and acts during the Spanish War. They propose to hunt up and lay before Congress all cases of cruelty on the part of our army, with the avowed purpose of sustaining the national honor. I must say this is the first time I ever heard of national honor being sustained by such methods. Have you, or anyone else, ever

heard a single word of protest from these people or anyone connected with them against the revolting cruelties of the enemy in the Phillippines? They evidently have no desire to learn about these things, but want some excuse for attacking our army, hoping thereby to bring dishonor upon our country before the world. The national honor never has, never can, and never will be protected by such methods. It is upheld and maintained today, as it always has been, by the patriotism of our people as represented by our army in the Civil War, in Cuba, the Philippines and China.

These attacks upon the army are for a double purpose, and you should not forget it. Every time they make this great "hub-bub" about cruelties they are hitting back to those that were in the Civil War. There is an element in this country that already has no use for the soldier of the Civil War. They are continually crying about the pension he is getting, that he is favored in the government services, etc., etc. They do not dare attack him openly, as yet, but do it covertly. There is no officer listening to me who did not see cruelties in the Civil War. Many of you have had to order them, but you know you were never brought to account for them when they were acts of necessity. We were always careful that no cruelties were committed by enlisted men, but whatever was done was by the order of an officer. It was the practice of the War Department never to interfere in these matters, leaving them to the officer who was in charge of the forces in the field. None of these things occurred without his knowledge; he was on the spot and knew the necessity for them, and if he did not take action it was considered that none was necessary, and they were seldom called to account for it afterwards, but in the Philippines they are bringing officers to account simply because of the outcry of people who care nothing for the merits of the case, except to make capital against out country's policy in maintaining itself in the Philippines. In view of all the facts, I must doubt the sincerity of those who are seeking to bring discredit upon our little army, the marvellous efficiency of which has won the admiration of the world. Under the regulations, it is impossible for the army to defend itself and make answer to these attacks, except through their own officers, and their reports do not reach the public, for the press seems to use only that which reflects upon the army, and omits that which is in its favor. It is the duty of every companion here, as well as of every good citizen, to enter his protest against these unjust attacks. The right side is beginning to get a hearing, and when the facts and causes for the action of the army are generally known, it will be found that our army is as humane and well-behaved a body of troops as ever went into a foreign country, and we must all assist in seeing that it receives justice.

The Last Year's Work, and Joining of Tracks of the Union Pacific and Central Pacific Railways.

Probably no event since the Civil War has been of such great moment to this country, and the future development of the West, as the joining of the tracks of the Union Pacific and Central Pacific Railways on May 10, 1869, and probably no State in the union has received as much benefit from that act as the State of Nebraska.

When you take into consideration all the circumstances attending the building of these two roads, the difficulty of obtaining material, the fact that the Union Pacific was built almost its entire length under a picket line of the army, with the Indians hostile, with capital for such great enterprises limited, and that the Union Pacific laid in twelve months 550 miles of track, and the Central Pacific over 400 miles, both companies laying their track from one end, one transporting its supplies from Omaha and the other from San Francisco, crowding into one year the work which to be economically done should have taken three years, the magnitude of the undertaking will be realized. It was a feat, so far as I know, never before or since equalled, in this nation or in the world.

The original intention of the law of 1862 and 1864 was that the Union Pacific should in ten years build its line to the California State line. At that time the Central Pacific was simply a local company. In the year 1865 the law was changed to allow the Central Pacific to build East until it met the tracks of the Union Pacific building West. Up to the fall of 1867 the Union Pacific building was limited to the amount of material that could be brought up the Missouri River from St. Louis and St. Joseph in about three months of water transportation, and the season only gave us eight months to utilize this material.

In making my plans for each year I always communicated with General Sherman, who was in command of the military division which covered the country through which we were building, in order that he might arrange his forces so as to protect my engineering parties, graders, track-layers, etc., from attack by Indians. In the spring of 1867 I wrote to him, and gave my plans for the building of 286 miles, and reaching the Laramie Plains in eight working months, and as in those times we did not work in winter, he was so astonished that he sent me the following letter:

"ST. LOUIS, January 18th, 1867.

I have just read with intense interest your letter of the 14th, and though you wanted it kept to myself, I believe you will sanction my sending it to Gen. Grant for his individual perusal, to be returned to me.

It is almost a miracle to grasp your proposition to finish to Fort Sanders this year, but you have done so much that I mistrust my own judgment and accept yours.

I regard this road of yours as the solution of the Indian affairs, and of the Mormon question, and therefore give you all I possibly can, but the demand for soldiers everywhere, and the slowness of enlistment, especially among the Blacks, limits our ability to respond. Naturally each officer exaggerates his own troubles, and appeals for men; thus Ord is greatly exercised lest the Blacks and Whites commence a War of Race, and would have four or five regiments scattered over the whole State of Arkansas to prevent local troubles. I want to punish and subdue the Indians, who are the enemies of our race and progress, but even in that, it is well sometimes to proceed with due deliberation. I now have General Terry on the Upper Missouri, General Auger with you, and General Hancock just below, all young enterprising men, fit for counsel or the field. I will endeavor to arrange so that hereafter all shall act on common principles and with a common purpose, and the first step, of course, is to arrange for the accumulation of the necessary men and material at the right points, for which your Railroad is the very thing.

Auger will be with you before this, and you will find him prepared to second you to the utmost of his power. I want him to study his problem and call on Grant through me, for the least force that is adequate, for we must respect the demand from other quarters. Of course, I am disposed to find fault that our soldiers are now tied up in the Southern States, but in the light they are now regarded it would be impolitic for me to say so publicly. All I can do is to keep General Grant well informed, so that he may distribute his army to the best advantage for the whole country.

As to supplies, General Auger will be, and is, at liberty to control this question according to the state of facts. The staff officers at Omaha are supplied with funds, and are on the spot, authorized to buy or call for supplies from Chicago or St. Louis. Though West Iowa might supply your markets abundantly, yet if suddenly called on for millions of pounds of flour, sugar, coffee and bacon, they would jump the price, but you know we now have Quartermasters and Commissaries absolutely disinterested, and qualified to arrange this matter.

I will surely be up this year many times, and will go over every rail more than once. I don't want to go to Utah until your road approaches Bridger, which cannot be this year; and I don't want Congress to bother itself about Mormon affairs till then—and the Gentiles would do well to hold their tongues and pens until it becomes feasable to act in case of laws or threats. It is nonsense now for us to send a large force there, and besides it is impossible, and would be to the interest of the Mormons, by the prices they would exact of us for meat and bread.

Don't fail to keep in touch with Auger, Myers, etc., who can be of service to you in many ways"

How necessary the aid of the army was, and how much depended upon its protection, is best made clear by giving one of my letters on that subject to General Sherman. It is as follows.

"COUNCIL BLUFFS, May 20th, 1867.

My dear General:—

I am beginning to have serious doubts as to Gen. Auger's ability to make a campaign into Powder River, and at the same time give ample protection to the railroad, the mail route and the telegraph. His forces are too limited to do all well, while they are sufficient to do one of them efficiently.

In the last two weeks the Indians have developed their game same as they did in the spring of '65.

1st. They struck us this side of Sedgwick and cleaned out two of our sub-contractors of everything they had, and scared the workmen out of their boots, so they abandoned the work and we cannot get them back.

2nd. They struck one of my engineering parties on Lodge Pole and took one pair of mules, and notified them to leave, pulling up all our stakes, etc.

3rd. They attacked our tie men in the Black Hills and drove them off the Cheyenne, burning up their traps, etc., and also cleaned out one small party on Laramie Plains.

4th. They attacked Mr. Brown's engineering party, on the 14th, at Rock Creek, killing one of his men, Mr. Stephen Clark of New York, taking his stock; and also killed one of the escort, and took part of their stock. While pitching into us, they burned the stage station called Fairview, between Morgan and Sedgwick, also burned stage station at Cooper Creek, and Rock Creek, West of Saunders, taking stock.

The mail will stop unless Auger will protect the stations. You know men will not run those routes with scalping Indians along them, unless troops are there to protect them. And we cannot hold our men to our work unless we have troops, and Auger cannot furnish them even after the road is built. Our station men will not stay at the tanks and stations, 20 miles apart, unprotected.

The great difficulty is that Auger has only two companies of cavalry to scout the whole line, and seven or eight companies of infantry to protect 300 miles of opened work. My engineering parties are driven into Sanders, and Auger says it is now impossible to increase their escort, and they are working in the worst Indian country you have got. You must take into consideration the line over Laramie Plains. It is the most exposed of all, and where we have got to operate extensively this season. Would it not be best to garrison the posts of Laramie, Casper, Reno, Phil Kearney and C. F. Smith strongly, so that 200 to 400 men can at any time be massed to go after any bands and place them all under an active officer, and let him take care of the Indians up there? No white man, or train, except Government, will travel that route this year, therefore to take care of the posts we have there, and to hold the Indians up there is all that is required. Let Auger take the rest of his forces and operate along the line from North Platte west. He will then have force enough to give confidence to the workmen, the stage and the emigrants.

I submit this for you to consider. When we went into the Powder River country in '65, we took more mounted troops to hold open the stage route alone than Gen. Auger has got in his department, and he has got just as big a job on his hands now as we had then, and larger, because the Indians have more confidence.

If Chas. Bent, or George, is with the Southern Cheyennes, they will play h—l with our completed road. We are now at Alkali, 40 miles west of North Platte, and I tremble every day for fear of a stampede. Have smothered all of the recent attacks and kept them out of the press. Auger and myself only know it, but should our men get at the real truth they will stampede. State agents, telegraph men, emigrants, tie contractors, and R. R. men of all description out there are pressing for protection, and while Auger feels the importance of giving it, how can he if he moves all his mounted men 300 miles north? If the Indians south had kept quiet, I should have felt easier, but between two fires, with the temptation we are holding out to them in the vast amount of stock, provisions, etc., on the line, with such temporary means as we have to protect ourselves, I know they will give us grief. I know from a long talk with Gen. Auger that he does not feel competent to protect these routes and make the

campaign. And knowing this, I have written you freely. I say nothing to anyone else, because I am determined to go through to Crow Creek if we have to abandon everything else, no matter what the Indians do. I am going up on our road. Unfortunately, I am sick; have been for two weeks confined to the house, but my presence up there will give confidence to a portion of our men. If we can hold our men to it, we will be at Sedgwick in June.

If Auger had another regiment of cavalry, that alone would put him on his feet. I have very strong convictions that Auger should put his energies on the great route, while Hancock uses his movable force to follow and fight the Cheyennes and Sioux on the Platte and Smoky Hills. The Arapahoes will soon be heard from. They are working towards Laramie Plains, and when they get to work we will have fun. I do not see how we are to be protected from Sedgwick to Bridgers Pass with less than a regiment of cavalry. I am looking every day to have them burn our ties distributed up Pole Creek. We have been placing them on every ½ mile, 1300 in a place, and if disposed, they could do us irreparable damage."

During 1867 it was discovered that the Central Pacific, taking advantage of the change in the law, proposed to bend every effort to reach Salt Lake before the Union Pacific reached that point with its track. The completion of the Northwestern Railway to Council Bluffs, November 7, 1867, gave us an all rail communication East, which enabled us to chaage our whole plans, and in the winter of 1867-68 I went to New York, where the necessity of reaching Salt Lake that year (1868) was thoroughly discussed, and I was instructed to lay the plans for the next year's work to build as far west as possible, and on my return to Omaha I called around me my staff, and we made our plans with a view of reaching Ogden, on Salt Lake, in the year 1868, 502 miles west of the end of the track, and Humboldt Wells, 216 miles west of Ogden, during the spring of 1869. While the preliminary lines for the road had been run, and the country selected through which the road should be built, no final location had been made west of Ft. Sanders, now Laramie City, so that the entire line had to be located and built. We distributed the engineering parties during the winter, in order that they could be on the ground as soon as spring opened. I remember that the parties which went into Utah had to cross the Wasatch Mountains on sledges, the snow being over the top of the telegraph poles. The track in 1867 had been carried over the Black Hills, reaching the timber country, and during that winter we utilized all the force we could get to get out ties and run them down mountain streams and take them out at our crossings. This relieved us of the great problem

of transporting ties from the Missouri River for the line west of the Black Hills, an average distance of 800 miles. All the material and supplies of all kinds, not only the material for building the road, but for all the forces connected with its construction, and everybody then living in that country, had to be transported from the Missouri River, and it took about forty cars a day to supply the front. The country afforded us nothing except the roadbed and ties after we reached the Black Hills.

About April 1st the spring opened so that we commenced our grading at Laramie, and the laying of our track began on the Black Hills. Our men worked from daylight to dark, and I do not know of a single day's loss of time from the time we commenced until we ended. There was a general determination, not only among those in charge, but all of the employees, to do their utmost, and there was an esprit de corps that has not been seen since, and I think never existed before except in an army. In fact, the force was a well trained army, most of the heads of it having been trained officers and soldiers, and in any emergency they could be called into service and lined up the same as they were in the war. We extended the grading force first to Green River, then to Ogden, on Salt Lake, then to Humboldt Wells, where our grading was finally stopped. Winter overtook us at the eastern foot of the Wasatch Mountain range, and the grading over that range was completed in the winter, the earth being blasted the same as the rock. A good deal of the track over that range of mountains was laid on a bank that was covered with ice and snow, and one of General Casement's track laying trains slid off the ice bodily, track and all, into the ditch. We reached Ogden after about nine months work, and then bent all our energies for the Humboldt Wells.

In the meantime, the Central Pacific, which had a much less distance to cover to reach Ogden from the west than we had from the east, was coming forward each day with great rapidity. Their forces were almost entirely Chinese, while our force was made up mostly from citizens of our own country. The Central Pacific, to our astonishment filed its map claiming to build as far east as the head of Echo, some distance east of Ogden. As soon as their track reached Humboldt Wells I called off our graders on that section and concentrated them between Ogden and Promontory, with a view of meeting the Central Pacific as far west of Ogden as possible, and the work accomplished by both companies I think has never been equalled. The amount of track that was laid down by Casement Brothers averaged about 2 miles per day, and their best day's work was over 8 mles. We worked seven days in the week, and every hour of the day that light gave us. The

strain became greater as the distance between the companies narrowed, and we were not only pressed forward by our own companies, but by the whole United States, who watched our progress from day to day with more interest than those upon the ground. About the first of May we made an agreement with the Central Pacific to join our tracks at Promontory, and, in accordance with that agreement, on the 10th day of May the tracks were then and there joined with simple but impressive ceremonies. There were but few people from the East present on that day, and a train or two only from California, but the hundreds of workmen at the end of the track on each side crowded around, and saw the driving of the last spike. The engineers run their engines up until they touched, each breaking a bottle of champagne on the opposite engine, as a recognition of the completion of the work and its final launching upon the world.

I did not forget to communicate with my old commander, General Sherman, who had taken such great interest in the entire work. Generals Grant and Sherman had rendered us every assistance possible, giving us all the protection the limited force at their command would allow, without which it would have been impossible for us to have completed the work in four years for which the Government considered ten necessary, and fixed that time in the law. In answer to my dispatch General Sherman sent the following:

"WASHINGTON, May 11, 1869.

General G. M. DODGE:

In common with millions, I sat yesterday and heard the mystic taps of the telegraphic battery announce the nailing of the last spike in the great Pacific road. Indeed, am I its friend? Yea. Yet, am I a part of it, for as early as 1854 I was Vice-President of the effort begun in San Francisco under the contract of Robinson, Seymour & Company. As soon as General Thomas makes certain preliminary inspections in his new command on the Pacific, I will go out and, I need not say, will have different facilities from that of 1846, when the only way to California was by sail around Cape Horn, taking our ships 196 days. All honor to you, to Durant, to Jack and Dan Casement, to Reed, and the thousands of brave fellows who have wrought out this glorious problem, spite of changes, storms, and even doubts of the incredulous, and all the obstacles you have now happily surmounted.

W. T. SHERMAN, General."

The Central Pacific, having completed its work over the Sierra Nevada range in 1867, its line from there East was by the Humboldt Valley and skirting Salt lake on the north, and its work this year, was therefore, comparatively light, but it labored under the great difficulty that all of its material and equipment had to be carried from New York or Pennsylvania, or a foreign country, around the Horn and landed in San Francisco before it could be used from there East. This made it necessary for it to make its plans and provide its material one or two years before its use. This they did, and executed them with great ability and wonderful celerity. The Union Pacific had no doubt but that it could build to meet the Central Pacific at Humboldt, but had to use all its strength to stop it before it reached Salt Lake, as it had graded its line to Ogden, and we met its track at Promontory.

From the first day of April, 1868 until May 10, 1869, only thirteen months, the Union Pacific built and laid track over 555 miles of road, and graded its line to Humboldt Wells, making a total distance covered by its force of 726 miles of line, and transported all its material and supplies from the Missouri River. The ties for the work west of Promontory had to be hauled by team twenty-five or fifty miles. There were engaged upon the work about ten thousand men and ten thousand animals, a portion of these being used in trains for supplying the forces working beyond the end of track, all of which had to be supplied.

In the grading of the line the Mormons were a great factor, as Brigham Young entered into the question of building the road with great earnestness and ability, and commanded all the people under him to turn out and take contracts, and aid in every way possible.

The Union Pacific in this time built its line over its greatest physical obstacles. It crossed two ranges of mountains and the divide of the continent, and over one of the ranges, the Wasatch, the work was the heaviest on the entire line. How well it performed its work, located and built its road, is shown by the following extract from the report of the distinguished board of engineers sent out to examine and report on behalf of the Government.

"Taken as a whole the Union Pacific Railroad has been well constructed. The general route for the line is exceedingly well selected, crossing the Rocky Mountain ranges at some of the most favorable passes on the continent, and possessing capabilities for easv grades and favorable alignments unsurpassed by any other railway line on similarly elevated grounds. The energy and perseverance with which the work has been urged forward and the rapidity with which it has been executed, are without parallel in history. In the grandeur and magnitude of the undertaking it has never been equalled, and no other line compares with this in the arid and barren character of the country

it traverses, giving rise to unusual inconveniences and difficulties, and imposing the necessity of obtaining almost every requisite of material, of labor and of supplies for its construction, from the extreme initial point."

We are,

Very respectfully, your obedient servants,

G. K. WARREN, Brevet Major General, U. S. A.
J. BLICKENSDERFER, Jr., Civil Engineer.
JAMES BARNES, Civil Engineer.
Special Commissioners Union Pacific Railroad.

HON. O. H. BROWNING,
Secretary of the Interior.

GEN. GRENVILLE M. DODGE

RECALLS BEGINNING OF OMAHA AND NEBRASKA.

General Grenville M. Dodge of Council Bluffs, gentleman, pioneer, Indian fighter and railway man, to whom Nebraska and the west owe a debt that can never be fully paid, was a guest of a notable luncheon at the Omaha club last Monday afternoon. The informal reception was planned by General Chas. A. Manderson, Captain H. E. Palmer, Dr. George L. Miller, J. Sterling Morton and others.

Addresses on that occasion were necessarily interesting, and particularly the speech of General Dodge was a most important document on the history of the west, so intimately connected with his own. Dr. Miller was a gracious master of ceremonies. General Dodge said:

GENERAL DODGE REMINISCENT.

When a voice called me up on the telephone and informed me that this club desired to give me a luncheon at which I could meet some of my old friends, I was surprised and rather objected, but the voice took me back to early days, and I thought if those who were with me then carried their friendship so long to desire to see me, it was a great honor and satisfaction to me, and I accepted with great pleasure.

Naturally when I meet you here under such circumstances my mind carries me back to the early '50s. when there was no Omaha and no Nebraska. The first time I crossed the Missouri river, with a small engineering party, I was greeted on this side by Indians. No white man lived here and no one in my party probably had ever seen an Indian before. My duties as chief of the party were to look up the country ahead, and the young boy who ran the party is a citizen today of Omaha. He was with me many years, an able, conscientious, hard working, faithful man, to whom I owe much, for he faithfully filled all his positions. He is well-known in this city, and I am glad to say has been honored by it, I speak of Mr. J. E. House.

I rode out to the Elkhorn river alone leaving House to follow. On arriving at the Elkhorn I was tired, unsaddled to give my horse a

chance to graze, and lay down to take a nap, I was aroused by the neighing of my horse, and looking across the valley saw a Pawnee Indian taking him as fast as he could force him along towards the river. Naturally I was frightened and hardly knew what to do, but instinct told me I must have my horse, and grabbing my rifle I started out towards the Indian, hollowing at the top of my voice. The pony was evidently as frightened at the Indian as I was, and was stubborn in his movements, and the Indian finally dropped him and fled across the Elkhorn.

Ten or twelve years afterwards, when I was in command of this department, and was ordered to open the different mail and stage lines across the continent, which had been closed for some months by the Indians, I raised a battalion of Pawnees to aid me as scouts and placed in command of them Major North, a very valuable officer, and they were of great service to me. The Indian who attempted to steal my horse was one of the battalion, and stated to Major North that I made so much noise that I scared the pony and himself so that he got away from me as fast as possible and never stopped running until he reached the Pawnee village across the Platte.

On my return to the party I found it encamped on the emigrant road leading from Florence to the Elkhorn at the crossing of the Big Pappillion. During the day the Indians had been helping themselves and the party was in a far from happy state of mind, in fact the Indians had actual possession of the camp, and you can see my introduction to Nebraska was anything but a satisfactory one.

EARLY HISTORY LIKE FICTION.

Now, if I should try to portray to you or any one the experiences, the trials and the sufferings of the picket line of settlement and explorations in those days, you would declare it more fiction than fact. Early friendships made under such circumstances are calculated to last, and it is one of the great gratifications of my life that the ties that bound us together never have been sundered. I cannot tell you anything of Omaha to-day, but probably no one has a better knowledge of the circumstances and facts that founded Omaha as a future great city. If you knew them all, you could see upon what slender threads at times its existence depended. Omaha as a city was determined long before it was settled. It came from the settlement of the location on tne Missouri river of the surveys made under the direction of Henry Farnam and William Cheffield far in advance of any settlement of this territory. It fell to my lot, under the direction of that distinguished engineer and more distinguished citizen, Peter A. Dey, to make the first survey across the state of Iowa and to

determine where in all probability a line would end upon the Missouri river in this parallel of latitude and where any railroad being built west would leave this river. None of you know the interests involved and the matters raised in determining that point. My survey demonstrated that the true engineering and commercial line crossing Iowa should come down the Mosquito and end at Council Bluffs, and going west the line should cross to the Platte valley and up that to the mountains, and so on west. The financial interests in Iowa were favorable to a line running down the Pigeon and crossing to Florence; another diversion was by Bellevue, another south of the Platte, and a fourth crossing at the mouth of the Boyer, and all these lines I examined.

Before my surveys had been finally determined the parties interested had planted their stakes at Florence and announced that as the crossing place of the Missouri river. My reports were sustained by Mr. Dey, and finally the decision made was reversed and the crossing determined to be opposite this place. This being determined, I was authorized to commence work at Council Bluffs, provided I could obtain local aid, and Pottawattamie county gave me $300,000 in bonds and Mr. Farnum furnished the funds for doing the grading and what work was done up to the time that all work in the state was stopped on account of the panic. There is no doubt that the final determination of what is now known as the Rock Island railway crossing the Missouri river, was what first drew the attention of people to Omaha and that brought to the Bluffs every railroad survey at that time being made across the state, and I think there are men at this table who will say to you that that was the real first beginning of Omaha.

CHAT WITH LINCOLN IN THE BLUFFS.

In 1858, if I recollect rightly, on my way from reconnaissances west with my party, which had been out the entire summer, I camped my party in Council Bluffs and went to the Pacific House. At that time Abraham Lincoln was visiting the Bluffs. He heard of my return from my surveys and sought me out at the Pacific House, and on the porch of that hotel he sat with me for two hours or more and drew out of me all the facts I had obtained in my surveys and naturally my opinion as to the route for a railroad west and as to the feasibility of building it. I thought no more of this at the time than that possibly I had been giving away secrets that belonged to my employers in this work.

In 1862 whilst in command of the District of Cornith, Mississippi, I receive a dispatch from General Grant to proceed to Washington and report to the president. No explanation coming with the dispatch.

I was a little alarmed, for they had come to me at Corinth a great many negroes and I had placed them in what was known as a contraband camp and had placed over them certain soldiers as guards. This caused me a good deal of annoyance and trouble. The white soldiers did not like the duty and took every opportunity to annoy the negroes, even in some cases going as far as to shoot them. The superintendent of the camp was Chaplain Alexander of an Ohio regiment, a very able and excellent man, and he suggested one day to me that he believed that negroes would be better to guard the contraband camp than white soldiers. I authorized him to raised one or two companies and I armed them, solely for the purpose of guarding these negroes I had no authority to do this and I did not at the time appreciate the importance that was to be given to it. There were many protests against this, and in the command there was considerable opposition to it, and I thought that my call to Washington was possibly to be called to account for this act.

When I reached Washington and reported to the president I soon ascertained that I was there for a consultation in regard to the eastern terminus of the Union Pacific railway. He had remembered his conversation with me on the Pacific House porch, and under the law it had been made his duty to determine the eastern terminus of the Union Pacific road, and those of you who remember that time know what pressure was brought to bear on the president to name different points far north and far south of this. After a long conversation with me, obtaining my views fully and the reasons for them, the president finally determined to make it, as you all know, on the western border of Iowa, opposite this city. That decision in my opinion, settled beyond all question the future of your city and your state

I wish to say here that while my surveys and my conclusions may have been of great benefit to you, still they were made because there was no question, from an engineering point of view, where the line crossing Iowa and going west from this river, should cross the Missouri river, and it was also my conclusion that it was the commercial line. The Lord had so constructed the country that any engineer who failed to take advantage of the great open road from here west to Salt Lake would not have been fit to belong to the profession; 600 miles of it up a single valley without a grade to exceed fifteen feet; the natural pass over the Rocky mountains, the lowest in all the range, and the divide of the continent, instead of being a mountain summit, has a basin 500 feet below the general level. It was a gratification to me at the time to have the support of all the people in the vicinity of this country in my views. There is no telling how much influence it had and weight it carried, and without being invidious or partial, I

really think that Omaha and Nebraska today owe more to my old friend and always faithful comrade and supporter. Dr. George L. Miller, for the success of these efforts, than any other man. I could show you many of the benefits he brought to you, even more than he knows himself, and he was the most unselfish and determined continuous fighter for his city and state that I ever knew, and I take pleasure here in his own home in paying my tribute to him.

UNION PACIFIC'S WORK.

Now, gentlemen, this city and state for their great prosperity, after the fact, are mostly indebted to the Union Pacific railway. It blazed the way across the continent. They took all the chances and solved the problem of the building of a railroad to the Pacific, not only from an engineering point of view, but also from a commercial one, and it was, therefore, easy after that for all roads to follow. It was at that time a very great problem if a road built could ever earn its interest. After its completion the board of directors of the company requested me to make an estimate of the gross earnings per mile for the next ten years. They desired an estimate from which they could prove to the people that it would be able to pay the interest upon the first mortgage bonds, and after calling to my aid all the people who had knowledge of the capabilities of the country west of the Missouri river, as well as those of China and Japan, and, in fact, of all Asia, the best I could do was to report to them gross earnings within ten years of $5,000 per mile, and if I remember rightly, in less than five years the road earned $10,000 per mile. So you see how little those who had the best knowledge of this country appreciated what its development would bring about.

The earnings of the Union Pacific made it safe for any other road to enter the territory, and to the Farnams, the Ames, the Dillons, Goulds, Scott, Huntington and Stamford in an early day, and to Perkins, Miller, Cable, Hewitt and many others of a later day, this country should give great honor and no abuse. It has been the fashion in our day to hold up to the coming generation the names of Astor, Vanderbilt and the noted Knickerbockers as the great men, commercially, for them to follow. These men invested their money in the east, where it was safe and sure of dividends, but the men who developed the country and brought in their millions without one cent in return, they are the ones you and all others are indebted to for their foresight, their risking everything and finally building up a great empire west of the lakes. Most of those of the earlier day have passed away, and this country is now awakening to the credit due them, which I hope will sometime be paid them.

PRESENT RAILWAY COMBINATION.

When you come down to the present time, I admit that I am not up to the times. I never dreamed that the Union Pacific railroad would control the Southern Pacific. My fear was always that the ownership would be in the Southern Pacific. You must not sit still and pass by what there is for you here in this great control. Your business men must get near to the throne, and use your energies like Miller and Kennedy, and Saunders and Millard and many others did in an earlier day to take the benefits of these new developments. Nor need you be afraid of the great combinations just completed in the northwest. It will not raise the rates of freight one mill nor of passengers one cent. The men at the head of that gigantic enterprise are broad-minded. They have thought and built well, and they will bring stability, development and great wealth, that cannot but be of great benefit to you. You must not forget one of the great advantages of such combinations to a new country. They have behind them such an immense capital that when you go to them with any project that has merit in it, for the development of your country, they are able to adopt it and carry it out, whilst in an earlier day projects were often presented to those who controlled the internal improvements of this country which they saw the merits of and were anxious to take hold of, but it was impossible for them to obtain the capital at those times to do it. Nor must you forget what this combination means. The country west of here has hardly been scratched and with the brains and capital of the country pushing forward its developement with steam and electricity and air, what one here can prophesy what fifty years will develop between here and the Pacific ocean?

I know there is some nervousness among people about these great combinations, but those that are not upon a solid basis will topple over from their overweight, and the others will continue and grow and bring stability to all kinds of business. The commercial man wants to know that he can safely lay down plans for six months or a year, and under such direction he can safely do it, and it is a mistake to attack them before you are hurt. You will find greater benefits coming to your country by supporting and aiding them rather than by abuse and opposition.

New blood must take the place of old, and I bid you godspeed in your efforts. And now, my friends, in our old age the great satisfaction to all of you and to me is to know that our early efforts are both recognized and appreciated; that the old friendships acquired in trials and tribulations are still fresh and true, and to my old friends and all of you I wish I knew how to express to you what is in my heart, but I cannot. I can only say, I thank you with all my heart.

RESOLUTIONS PRESENTED TO

MAJOR GENERAL GRENVILLE M. DODGE,

by Members of his Staff at Inauguration of Grant's Tomb.

Whereas, on the 27th day of April, 1897, the Tomb of General Ulysses S. Grant was completed and formally transferred to the City of New York, his remains having first been reverently and appropriately enshrined within; and

Whereas, the people of the country, as well as of the City and State, adopted that event for an outpouring of patriotic veneration, to be displayed by participation of their President and Cabinet, their Governors, chief magistrates, veterans—by tens of thousands—and representative bodies of the army and navy, with entire divisions of the militia of adjacent states, and lesser bodies from a distance, uniting with the multitude at home, in the ceremonial transfer; and

Whereas, the prospective assemblage of a concourse so honorable and so vast, upon so august an occasion, demanded for its management the prescient care and supervision of a Marshall who should be himself identified with that which was commemorated, with personal history adequate to the dignity of the review, and capacity insuring a well ordered progress; and

Whereas, Major General Grenville M. Dodge was lately a corps commander in the Army of the Tennessee, afterwards Chief of Location and Construction of the Union Pacific Railroad, and is now Commander in New York of the Military Order of the Loyal Legion, and President of the Society of the Army of the Tennessee, and

Whereas, General Dodge was not only during the late war, was a much prized comrade and associate of General Grant, but to the end of his life enjoyed the same relation to that great commander, while his civil achievements meantime have shown that his mastery of men continues unimpaired; and

Whereas, the result of his selection as Grand Marshall, has been that every incident of the great event befitted the occasion, that it transpired without mistake or accident, and with features that have

helped to glorify and strengthen loyalty and patriotic confidence; and

Whereas, it was our privilege as members of his staff and Aides de Camp, to share with him the task and the achievement; and to enjoy and appreciate that fellowship and service; in commemoration of which we have caused his portrait to be painted, in order that it might be presented to him, to remind him of our regard, and to perpetuate his likeness;

Therefore, be it resolved, that we, the undersigned, members of the staff and Aides de Camp to Major General Grenville M. Dodge, Grand Marshall and Master of Ceremonies at the formal transfer to the City of New York, on the 27th day of April, 1897, of the Tomb in which are enshrined the remains of General Ulysses S. Grant, do hereby present to him the accompanying portrait of himself, and beg that he will except it with this expression of our esteem.

COMMITTEE.

Frank C. Loveland, Chairman,
A. Noel Blakeman,
Alphonso H. Alker,
Edward H. Ripley,
Richard E. Cochran, Treasurer,
Charles N. Swift,
William Hemstreet,
Francis M. Gibson.

Francis R Appleton, Alva B. Adams, James Allen, E. E. Alcott, Daniel Butterfield, George De F. Braton, Frederick Brackett, W. Butler Beck, Robert B. Baker, Abbott Brown, C. G. Bacon, Jr., Nathan Bickford, Henry Birrell, R. E. Burdick, Ashley W. Cole, Francis J. Crilly, William F. Cody, John Crane, Elisha K. Camp, P. F. Collier, C H. T. Collis, A. M. Clark, John H. Cook, E. H. Conklin, Henry O Clark, H. C. Corbin, Charles Curie, Jr., William H. Cummings, H. H. C. Dunwoody, J. L. De Peyster, Ernest A Des Marets, Nicholas W. Day, John B. Doherty, A. E. Drake, Richard Deeves, Frank S. De Ronde, John W. Donovan, Stewart Duncan, R. D. Evens, Fitz Hugh Edwards, Dudley Evans, Charles W. Fuller, F. Farnsworth, John P. Faure, W. H. Goddard, A. H. Goetting, John Hayes, Colgate Hoyt, Paul Hargreave, George F. Hinten, F. C. Hollins, C. R. Hickox, Jr., Charles F. Homer, De Ruyter Hollins, William E. Horton, Charles E. Heuberer, E. B. Ives, L. C. Ivory, James Jourdon, John W. Joyce, John A. Johnston, F. A. Juilliard, Henry P. Kingsbury, Bryan L. Kennally, Theodore F. Kane, Horatio C. King, John Winthrop Loveland, Edson Lewis, A. W. Lillenthal, Fred Levy, Philip B. Low, J. Howard Leman, F. H. Lord, Charles Sumner Lester, F. W. Mix, J. W. Miller, George R. Manchester, C. B. Morris, C. F. Meek, H. W.

McVicker, John S. McDonald, J. Van Vechten Olcott, J. C. O'Connor, F. A. Plummer, John N. Partridge, G. F. Perrenaud, J. Fred Pierson, H. T. Pierce, James Parker, T. F. Rodenbough, Charles F. Roberts, George S. Redfield, Oscar L. Richard, Henry C. Rhoades, Edward Rascovar, William Cary Sanger, 2nd, C. A. Stanton, Nate F Salisbury, William J. Sewell, Henry L. Swords, Charles H. Sloat, H. T. Stancliff, Henry C. Swords, F. W. Seagrist, Jr., John H. Stoppani, M. Standish, W. R. Spooner, A. W. Swalm, J. C. Shotts, W. H. Stratton, George T. Steinberg, A. F. Schermerhorn, Frederick A. Starring, J. R. Sheffield, Ivan Tailof, Albert Tilt, C. W. Tilinghast, Aaron Venderbilt, W. E. Van Wyck, Thomas L. Watson, J. O. Woodward, A. F. Walker, Louis Wendell, B. H. Warner, John G. Wintjen, Alfred E. Watson, W. D. H. Washington, E. L. Zalinski.

Colonel Loveland and Gentlemen:

I cannot say that your magnificent and appropriate gift is a surprise, as I have had to be with it and watch its growth from the beginning, but your generous act when first made known to me astonished me, as I had not thought after that cold, windy day in April that you would be anxious to pass it down to history, and while I fully appreciate the high compliment you pay me, I also appreciate that it is to commemorate a great event that is to live in the history and records of this city and country.

When the city selected me to organize and command the parade that was to notify the world of the completion of the Grant Monument, I was certainly surprised, as it was furthest from my thoughts, but I appreciated most fully the great honor and determined to give the city no cause to regret their confidence in me. It also gave me one more opportunity to honor that great soldier and statesman, who gave me every promotion in rank and command after I came under his orders, until he raised me to the highest rank and command in the army, and at the close of the war had selected me for a high rank in the Regular Army, which I could not accept, and in civil life after the war he was, if possible, more generous and complimentary in selecting me for distinguished positions, which I could only partially accept.

I therefore threw aside my work for two months and devoted my time to the organization of the parade. Experience had taught us how to make it successful, and I immediately called around me experienced officers of the army, navy, volunteers and prominent citizens as a working staff, and we sat down to a problem, which in its logistics was a difficult one. The column in its line of march doubled upon itself. In its formation and march it cut all the lines of travel

that were to take a million people to the ground, and in passing around the monument we were in a culdesac that the simplest obstruction would have been fatal to the success of the parade. This staff gave their time and labor without any cost to the city, working from morning until midnight. Very few know the amount of labor it requires to successfully organize and move the units that compose a parade of 60,000 people gathered from all over the country, concentrated, marched before two reviewing officers and dispatched to their homes within twelve hours, making their time throughout the entire route to the moment, without a hitch, accident or delay.

When we first considered the plan of handling two land and one naval parade, and bring all to their destination at the appointed moment, I desired to move the Presidential parade over a different route from that the main column was to take, and suggested 24th Street and Eighth Avenue, but our chief, the Mayor, said "No", they must take in the best part of the city, so I tried it up Broadway, but found that route would stop our best lines of communication one hour. I was, therefore, forced to pass it over our main route at the hour of the assembling of our main column, knowing any hitch would be disastrous to the successful concentration and movement of the main column. I looked for a soldier who could move the President and diplomats on the moment, and selected General Butterfield, and his great success is known to you all. The naval parade was organized just as ably under the direction of my naval aide, Captain Chester, and we were fortunate in having in command of that parade Admiral Gherardi, whose experience made it easy for him to fit the movement of the naval and marine columns to ours, which was done promptly and successfully. The Division Commanders of the land parade were distinguished officers of the army and prominent citizens, all experienced, therefore I knew the column once formed and moved promptly, would reach its destination on time and in accordance with orders.

There is no doubt but that your work was appreciated by the city and all the military and civic organizations composing the columns, as there has been one unanimous commendation of it. Many applications have come to me since for copies of our orders and methods of organization, even from foreign countries. No doubt the terrible day added to our credit, as those who stood for so many hours in the cold supposed that we suffered as they did.

My first experiences in the war taught me the value of a staff. At first they were thought to be more of an ornament than for use, and the general idea was that if an officer could obtain a staff detail he had a safe and easy place, but it was not long before it was found that

a good staff officer had no rest. He had to eat and sleep wherever he could get a chance; that it was easy to shift to his shoulders any fault, and very hard to give him proper credit and reward, and in the latter part of the war the staff and staff departments came to the front taking their proper place in the service. I was one of the officers who had the reputation of keeping a staff busy, and one who was always asking for educated, experienced officers of the staff. In fact, I think the only personal requests that I made were for the detailing of officers to my staff who were well known for experience and efficiency. I was fortunate in having an able staff in all the commands I held, and as I left one command to go to another, one of my greatest regrets was that I had to part with my military family, and it is one of the greatest pleasures of my life since the war that the officers who served with me on my staff, notwithstanding the merciless way in which I used them, always came to see me and have a place for me in there lives and hearts, and it is also one of my greatest pleasures whenever I have the opportunity to give due credit to the work of the staff and staff departments in the war.

Our success in this parade is due to the efficient work of my staff and division commanders. My staff were all experienced in their duties and carefully selected for their adaptability for the details, and the military family that handled this parade, although they were together only two months, formed friendships that will continue during our lives. I was greatly gratified on the day of the parade to hear the reports of the chiefs who handled the parade, of the interest and esprit de corps of the gentlemen who volunteered for that day's hard work, and I have often been complimented for their efficiency and appearance, and it is not necessary for me to say to them that I most fully appreciate their work.

There is no doubt that every staff officer was impressed on the day of the parade with the efficiency shown by the different city departments in the way they had prepared n atters to make sure our success. My two months experience with the Mayor and his chiefs of departments caused me to have great respect for the business way in which they handled their work. This was especially the case with the Police Department. We all saw with what ability they controlled the crowds and with what efficiency they responded to all the requests of the staff, and it was a great satisfaction to me to give such testimony and credit to their arduous work.

It seems to me the artist has made a remarkable success of your commission. If the unanimous approval of all who have seen it is to be taken, he must justly be proud of his work. I, myself, consider it a very great painting and a great success.

How can I in words extend to you my appreciation of the great compliment you pay me in presenting me with this commemorative painting? I shall hold it as a momento of that great event, and shall endeavor to place it where it can always be seen and have made known what it represents.

At one time General Sherman was traveling with me over the State of Ohio, and at every station the people crowded to see him and pay him honor. He said to me that he evidently did not appreciate the importance of the work he had done or looked upon it as the people did, and that the great love and many kindnesses he had received since the war were very impressive to him, and as he grew older he appreciated them more and more. He said that the enthusiasm and praise that were given during the war in the bustle and cruelty of great campaigns and battles did not carry to him the full appreciation of the feelings of the people. But now, so many years after the war, the great love that the people seemed to have for those who were successful in the war, or had accomplished great success seemed to grow as time passed by, and it was hard for him to give the proper and heart-felt acknowledgments that such demonstrations required, and I can appreciate more fully now than I did then the truth of his sentiments, and I lack more than ever he did the ability and language to convey to you my thoughts and my feelings. I can only say that I thank you with all my heart.

REMARKS OF

GEN. G. M. DODGE, CAMP SONS OF VETERANS,

Georgetown, Mass.

As I stand here, I remember that when I was a boy ten, twelve or fourteen years old my great ambition was that Thanksgiving and Christmas would come, so I could walk some fourteen miles and spend these days with my grandfathers, grandmothers, uncles, aunts and cousins. In those days they all, or nearly all, lived in Georgetown and Rowley, they were accustomed to feed me on all the good things including hard cider and mince pie, and they were the happy days of my life. Some of these young veterans must have known this experience when they named their Camp for me, and I wish to say that the good teachings and examples I imbibed at those re-unions lasted me for a life time, and were many times of great assistance in my struggles and hardships. I appreciate just as fully as a person can the high compliment you have paid me in naming your Camp for me. It could not be done so well and so fully in any other place, or under any other circumstances.

Since those days I have seen our country grow from the Lakes to the Pacific, so that one journeying over it could not recognize it, but here the change is small, the customs almost all unchanged; Thank God! they were too good to change, and I come back to them better pleased to-day, for if it were not so I could not recognize the haunts of my boyhood.

You are the sons of veterans in war. Your fathers had but one thought, one motive, but one prayer, that was when their country was plunged into a great civil war that they should do their utmost, lay down their lives if necessary, to sustain the Government, maintain its flag, and demanding nothing but unconditional surrender from the enemy, and now when a warring foe stands before us, treacherous, and deceitful in its methods, what is your duty? It is the same as your fathers was, for Government, for flag and for country. No question of policy or what the future has for us should intervene. Demand of

your Government the same devotion to duty that Lincoln gave us, from your Generals the same victories that Grant, Sheridan, Sherman, Meade and Thomas gave, and finally when unconditional surrender comes, give them the treatment that Grant did, that shall make them look upon us as a great and magnanimous nation, that forces them to like us and feel thankful that we thoroughly thrashed them. When a nation is at war its people have no right to do aught but support it. When it has conquered its foes it is time enough to criticise, and discover its mistakes and discuss and lay down the policy that shall be used by us in treating the enemy. Do not forget the history of all people who failed to support their government when its flag was fired upon. There is no instance where the people of a country have failed to support their flag that their nation has not lost its position in the world and gone to decay. When a nation is defeated in battle by a superior force it is not disgraced, but it obtains an honorable peace, but when a nation by force of arms is rescued from hundreds of years of misery and suffering and persecution and then turns upon its rescuers, its treachery is such that there can be but one result, that is defeat and punishment for its ungratefulness, and that will be the result now.